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This thesis is designed as a contribution to the economics of social
interaction with a focus on human emotions and thinking processes. The first
two chapters are empirical and the third chapter is theoretical.
Chapter one examines the extent to which punishments are motivated
by the emotion of anger or ‘fairness’ considerations. A laboratory experiment
uses a multi-round game where the punisher could not be sure whether a
selfish action of the punished may be ‘excused’ or not. The results show that
subjects tend to inflict a harsher punishment as the proportion of observed
selfish actions in previous rounds increases, after controlling for the current
action. The data can further test competing hypotheses of two theories: norm
compliance and spitefulness. One third of subjects punish an action that
fails to comply with the norm, but none habitually punish a spiteful person
regardless of the current action.
Chapter two investigates whether the individual tendency to think in-
tuitively or deliberately can lead to altruistic giving or punishment. An online
experiment uses a 40-item self-report questionnaire to measure individual re-
liance on intuitive feelings (Faith in Intuition) and personal tendency to engage
in deliberate thinking (Need for Cognition). The results show that people who
tend to think more deliberately are less prone to punish. An increase in the
cost of punishing reduces both punishment and giving. High reliance on in-
tuition is associated with greater sensitivity of punishment to a cost increase
than to a cost decrease, which might be explained by loss aversion.
Chapter three develops a model of interdependent preferences in the
presence of asymmetric information. The model explores the welfare conse-
quences of permitting divorce. Suppose each player has a private value of the
marriage and may or may not care about the partner’s value. When divorce
is possible, any player can use the threat of divorce to make demands on the
other player, but it might also reveal one’s own value of the marriage. A
well-known theoretical result is that asymmetric information routinely leads
to inefficient bargaining and divorce, but this model further shows that incor-
porating interdependent preferences can eliminate such inefficiencies. Thus,
asymmetric information is not a sufficient condition for inefficient divorce; the




Punishments: Testing Theories of
Cumulative Anger
1.1 Introduction
Recent research suggests that, consistent with casual observation, anger can
motivate people to punish others (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Hopfensitz & Reuben,
2009). However, little has been done to study what factors can predict anger.
Most studies focus on one-shot interaction, such as the ultimatum game, where
anger is potentially triggered as an immediate reaction to an unsatisfactory
proposal. By contrast, this study investigates to what extent a transgressor’s
history of norm violations can predict a punisher’s present and future anger
and punishment.
There is a common perception that history should matter: people tend
to punish repeat violators more harshly than first-timers. In most countries,
the law imposes harsher punishments for repeat offenders, and such legisla-
tion receives widespread public support (see Roberts, 1997). One explanation
for this comes from a principal-agent model (Polinsky & Rubinfeld, 1991), in
which the principal imposes a higher fine for the second offense in order to
optimally deter repeat offenders. These increasingly severe and thus ‘gradu-
ated’ punishments that have a goal of optimizing deterrence can, in theory,
be implemented without the emotion of anger, but anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that escalating anger plays an important role in motivating escalating
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punishments. For instance, an article by Trounstine (2014) reveals that the
U.S. public’s angry responses to brutal crimes have led to state and federal
legislation. Notably, these horrific crimes trigger not only anger but also the
occasional practice of naming a law after dead victims.1
This study examines the determinants of anger and punishments and
how these observed patterns relate to existing theories. We conduct a labo-
ratory experiment in which two subjects are matched and then play a multi-
round game. In each round, the first player decides whether to give an equal
share of a pot of money to the second player, and then the second player can
decide how much to punish the first player. Asymmetric information is created
between the two parties based on Durham’s (1987) observation that ‘repetitive
criminal involvement indicates the existence of “hidden” attributes possessed
by the offender.’ In our experiment, there is a random draw in each round to
determine the size of the pot, which can be either large or small with equal
probability. Crucially, only the first player knows the pot size. The first player
can then give either a high or low share. A low share is considered to be an
equal share if the pot is small or a selfish share if the pot is large. Because the
second player does not observe the pot size, he cannot be certain whether a
low share given by the first player is an equal or selfish share. We also measure
the second player’s reported level of anger with the first player.
Another aim of the experiment is to discriminate between two particular
theories of intrinsic motivation. One is Levine’s (1998) model of altruism and
spitefulness, and the other is Akerlof’s (2015) model of one’s duty to comply
with the norm. It would be difficult to test their specific predictions if there
exist external incentives for punishment. For instance, in a typical multi-round
game, a player might want to build a reputation of being a tough punisher in
early rounds in order to influence the other player to give more in future
rounds, and these future benefits become an external incentive. To isolate
the intrinsic motivation for punishment, we do not inform the first player how
much he is punished during the multi-round game, and the second player is
also aware of this. This design resembles situations where people criticize or
accuse others behind their back as a form of secret punishments.
We build a simple model to compare different theoretical predictions.
1The article by Trounstine (2014) gave many examples demonstrating how ‘a true
tragedy, driven by a media frenzy . . . leads to bad public policy’. One such example is
the ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’ law, a form of graduated sanctions. It was enacted by
California voters in response to two horrific murders in the 1990s.
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Because of the uncertainty about the pot size, the second player’s belief about
the first player’s type might be updated by Bayes’ rule based on the observed
sharing decisions. The standard self-interest assumption predicts that no one
will punish in any round because punishing is costly. Most theories of so-
cial preferences such as inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and
reciprocity (e.g. Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004) can predict positive pun-
ishment when there is a high likelihood of unequal outcomes or of unkind
intention, but they cannot predict gradual increments of punishments. The
reason is that these punishments are used to reduce inequality or to reciprocate
unkind intention, rather than to proportionally mitigate the anger provoked.
Both Levine (1998) and Akerlof (2015) can explain why the severity
of punishment might increase in an gradual manner. Levine proposes that
people care about whether their partner is an altruistic or spiteful person.
Hence, people can be kind to a partner who is believed to be altruistic; people
can be unkind to one who is believed to be spiteful. Levine predicts that people
will punish in proportion to the belief updated by Bayes’ theorem about their
partner’s selfishness, regardless of whether the partner gives a high or low
share in the current round. On the other hand, Akerlof assumes that some
people have a norm, such as an equal sharing norm, and expect their partner
to comply with the norm by giving an equal share. Anger is then provoked
by the extent to which the partner fails to comply with the norm. Akerlof
predicts that people will punish in proportion to the updated belief about
their partner’s selfishness, when their partner gives a low share in the current
round; otherwise, they do not punish at all because giving a high share is in
compliance with the norm.
Our results show that the first player’s history of sharing decisions sig-
nificantly affects the second player’s current punishment level, even after con-
trolling for the current sharing decision. More specifically, punishments esca-
late with the proportion of low shares the first player gives in previous rounds.
This provides the first experimental evidence of escalating punishments.
Next, we test whether punishment depends solely on the belief updated
by Bayes’ rule about the first player’s type (as in Levine) or punishment de-
pends on both the updated belief and the current sharing decision (as in Ak-
erlof). We find stronger support for Akerlof’s model than for Levine’s model.
Therefore, anger and punishments escalate with the updated belief about the
partner’s selfishness only when the partner’s current action fails to comply with
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the sharing norm. When the partner’s current action complies with the shar-
ing norm, the anger accumulated in previous rounds is mitigated and triggers
no harsher punishment.
Another contribution is to identify subjects who are likely to hold shar-
ing norms, which influence both how they behave and how they expect others
to behave. Importantly, not everyone holds the same expectation about how
much others should give. Suppose a person expects his partner to give an equal
share. When his partner’s current action complies with the expected sharing
norm, no punishment is deserved, even if he believes his partner is a selfish
person due to past actions. Indeed, we find in our sample about one third
of subjects behave in this way and punish only when there is non-compliance
with the norm in the current action. Although about a quarter of subjects
never punish, they still display escalating anger as if they expect others to
comply with a sharing norm. Moreover, if people believe that a sharing norm
exists, they should expect not only others but also themselves to give. Since
all subjects play a game as the first player and another as the second player,
we can and do find that subjects who tend to punish are more likely to give
than those who never punish.
1.2 Literature Review
This study contributes to the experimental literature on testing recently de-
veloped theories. There is a large body of empirical evidence on the im-
pact of fairness considerations on economic decisions, such as refusing to cut
wages during a recession (e.g. Kahneman et al. , 1986; Bewley, 1999) and en-
forcing contracts and social norms (e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Camerer &
Thaler, 1995). This has inspired a number of new theories that incorporate
nonstandard preferences, such as altruism (Levine, 1998), inequality aversion
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), reciprocity (Rabin, 1993;
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004), fairness intentions coupled with distribu-
tional equality (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), and anger over non-compliance
(Akerlof, 2015). These new theories not only help explain the empirical depar-
tures from the predictions of standard economic theory but also furnish many
testable hypotheses.
This research builds on the work of designing new experiments to test
the fine differences between competing hypotheses (Charness & Rabin, 2002;
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Falk et al. , 2005, 2008). Our experiment is designed to investigate how con-
cerns for fairness or anger over non-compliance accumulate over time. In
keeping with the previous related literature, our goal is to provide concrete
evidence to guide the effort of developing new economic theories.
Our experiment is closely related to Ostrom et al. (1992), who stud-
ied the impact of sanctioning opportunity in a multi-round common pool re-
source game. In their experiment, the subjects could only choose to impose
a fixed fine on others or not, so it was not possible to impose different levels
of punishments. There were also material incentives for punishing because
punishments in early rounds could affect other subjects’ decision to cooperate
in future rounds. To rule out such material incentives in our experiment, we
deliberately conceal from the first player the feedback about how much he was
punished in previous rounds until the end of the experiment.
A related seminal study by Fehr & Gächter (2000a) used a different
design to rule out future material incentives for punishment. Their multi-
round public goods experiment changed the composition of group members
from round to round so that players could not build individual reputations, but
the results still indicated a widespread willingness to punish. Fehr & Gächter
(2002) further showed the proximate cause for this kind of punishment is anger.
Their design did not provide the possibility of identifying other members’
history of contributions to the public goods. Our experiment in contrast does
allow the second player to identify their partner’s history of sharing decisions.
The purpose is to examine how a history of sharing decisions can affect current
anger and punishment.
Finally, our study contributes to the experimental literature that exam-
ines the individual heterogeneity in inflicting costly punishments. Anderson
& Putterman (2006) found three types of punishers in a public goods game.
One type virtually never punished, another type punished in response to the
extent of free riding, and the third type was called indiscriminate punishers
because they punished aggressively at all levels of free riding. Carpenter (2007)
also found support for this classification2 and suggested that some punishers
follow cultural norms because they punish despite paying a high cost of in-
flicting punishment. However, there is no direct evidence on this normative
story. Our data provide deeper analysis by examining the determinants of
2Carpenter (2007) further divided their subjects by whether they were contributors or
free riders themselves.
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anger level for different types of punishers. Specifically, subjects who never
punish have a similar pattern of escalating anger as other subjects who punish
primarily when their partner gives a low share in the current round. This
finding suggests that these two groups of subjects are likely to hold a similar
sharing norm that can trigger their anger but have different tolerance for the
cost of punishing. In contrast, a third group of subjects who indiscriminately
punish their partner, who may give a high or low share in the current round,
display no clear pattern of anger with regard to their partner’s sharing history.
1.3 Experimental Design
The experimental design places subjects into groups of two, and each group
plays a seven-round game. Within a group, one subject is assigned the role
of the ‘first-mover’, and the other the role of the ‘responder’. Each round
t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} consists of three stages. Let the pot size at round t be pit ∈
{20, 40}. In the first stage, a pot of money is randomly drawn to be large
(40) or small (20) with equal probability. In the second stage, the first-mover
can choose to give a share of xt to the responder and keep the rest of the pot
for himself, pit − xt. The share xt can be either high (20) or low (10). In the
third stage, the responder observes how much the first-mover gives him but
not the size of the pot.3 The responder can then choose how much to punish
the first-mover. Let the punishment unit be denoted by pt ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}.
Every unit of punishment reduces the first-mover’s earnings by one unit and
simultaneously costs the responder 0.3 units. The utility function at round
t for the first-mover is uF,t = pit − xt − pt, and the utility function for the
responder is uR,t = xt− 0.3pt. Figure 1.1 presents the experimental procedure
at round t. At the end of the seventh round the subjects switch roles and
repeat the same game but are matched with a different partner.
The first-mover could not receive any feedback about how much he or
she was punished by the responder in previous rounds, and this is common
knowledge to both players. This design excludes strategic punishments, which
are used to affect the first-mover’s sharing behaviour in future rounds. Since
there are no material benefits from using punishments in this game, the sub-
3Güth et al. (1996) uses a similar two-level ultimatum game with incomplete information
and finds that better informed parties try to behave in a way that others cannot be sure
that they are greedy. Thus, we can expect that the first-mover in our experimental design
is likely to take advantage of the responder.
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jects’ use of sanctions must suggest the presence of intrinsic motivation. This
design feature is important for ensuring a clean test of Levine’s notion of al-
truism and spitefulness and of Akerlof’s concept of one’s duty to comply with
the norm.
To elicit punishment decisions, we apply the strategy method in our
experiment, which requires the responder to provide a response for each fea-
sible action of the first-mover before he is informed of the first-mover’s actual
choice. Specifically, we collect one punishment decision for the case when the
first-mover gives a low share of 10 and another for the case when the first-mover
gives a high share of 20. After making these two contingent punishment deci-
sions, the responder is informed that the first-mover actually gives a high or
low share. Consequently, only the punishment decision in that specific case af-
fects payoffs. The entire procedure is carefully explained to the subjects in the
instructions provided both on paper and on the computer screens, along with
examples of screens which would be used in the experiment. Following that,
we ask the subjects several questions and then show the answers to enhance
their comprehension of the procedure.
In addition to examining the impact of the first-movers’ sharing be-
haviour on the responders’ punishment, we further investigate the responders’
reported anger with the first-movers. If anger is the proximate cause of punish-
ment, both punishment and anger should have similar patterns in responding
to the sharing decisions. At the end of each round, we ask the responders to
rate how angry they are with their partner on a seven-point scale ranging from
7
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Since the responders cannot observe the pot size, we suspect that they
would gradually form a belief about their partner’s type through the observed
sharing behaviour. To understand how this subjective belief might be formed,
the responders are asked to estimate the likelihood of their partner giving a
low share if the pot is large in the next round.4 This variable is named the
likelihood of selfish share and can take values from 0% to 100%.
All subjects in our experiment were students or staff from the University
of Warwick, who were recruited online through the Warwick Research Partic-
ipation System. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and conducted in the computer laboratory at Warwick Business School
in June and October 2014. A typical session lasted less than an hour, which
included paying the subjects individually. Subjects received experimental to-
kens throughout the experiment, and each token was converted into £0.01.
Thus, every decision counts, and the subjects each earned £3.85 on average.
1.4 Model and Predictions
We build a simple model to compare different theories of fairness and anger.
Suppose there is a continuum of types distributed uniformly on [0, 1] for the
first-movers. A first-mover of type q ∈ [0, 1] behaves selfishly with probability
q and behaves fairly with probability 1− q. Behaving fairly is to give an equal
share of the pot, whether large or small, and behaving selfishly is to give a low
share regardless of the pot size. Hence, type q can be considered as a proxy of
the degree of the first-mover’s selfishness.
This distributional assumption on q reflects a likely scenario where even
a fair-minded first-mover might be tempted to give selfishly occasionally, espe-
cially when, by chance, large pots are drawn more frequently than expected,
because the responder cannot observe the actual pot size. Moreover, Güth
et al. (1996) show that better informed people are inclined to “pretend fair-
ness” when there is incomplete information. In our experiment, we also find
that a substantial number of people behave fairly only some of the time. See
Appendix for more detail.
4These elicited estimates were not financially incentivized. Gächter & Renner (2010) find
that incentivizing beliefs can bias the levels of contribution in public goods experiments,
although the stated beliefs are closer to the actual contributions of other group members.
8
The responder does not observe the first-mover’s type. Given the as-
sumption of uniform distribution, the prior expectation about the first-mover’s
type is E (q) = 0.5. The responder can update the posterior distribution of q
at round t by Bayes’ theorem according to the partner’s sharing decisions up
to and including round t.
The responder can observe in each round whether the first-mover gives
a high or low share. However, since the pot size is unknown to the responder,
he cannot be sure whether a low share (xt = 10) is an equal share (if pit = 20)
or a selfish share (if pit = 40). Let B(t) be a Binomial random variable at
round t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} that represents the number of low shares the first-mover
gives to the responder out of t rounds. The random variable B(t) can take
values from zero to t low shares. The probability of observing a low share from




, where the first term is the fifty
percent chance of the pot being of a small size and the second term is the chance
of the pot being of a large size and the first-mover behaving selfishly. After
observing k number of low shares out of t rounds, the posterior probability
density function of q at round t is f (q|B(t) = k) = (1+q)k(1−q)t−k∫ 1
0 (1+q)
k(1−q)t−kdq . Let
qˆ (t, k) ≡ E (q|B(t) = k) be the expected value of the first-mover’s selfishness
after receiving k number of low shares out of t rounds.
The standard self-interest assumption predicts no one punishes because
punishment incurs a cost and yields no material benefits to the punishers. Fehr
& Schmidt’s (1999) inequality aversion model and Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger’s
(2004) reciprocity model can both predict the use of punishment as a means to
reduce inequality or to reciprocate ill intention. However, they cannot account
for the possibility of gradual increments of punishments. The reason is that
the optimal level of punishment is not chosen in direct proportion to the belief
updated by Bayes’ rule about the partner’s selfishness. Thus, most theories
are incapable of predicting escalating punishments.
In contrast, Levine’s (1998) model of altruism and spitefulness can pro-
vide an explanation for why the severity of punishment might increase in
proportion to the belief updated by Bayes’ rule about first-mover’s selfishness.
Levine (1998) proposes that people care whether their partner is an altruis-
tic or spiteful person. Consequently, people can be kind to a partner who is
believed to be altruistic; people can be unkind to one who is believed to be
spiteful. Based on this insight, we assume that anger is a function of qˆ (t, k),
the belief about the first-mover’s selfishness at round t. We can write the
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responder’s utility function at round t in the following functional form:
uR,t = xt − 0.3pt − L (qˆ (t, k))
pt
, (1.1)
where L (qˆ (t, k)) is Levine’s function of anger, and L (0) = 0, L (y) > 0 and
L
′
(y) > 0 for y ∈ (0, 1]. The last term of the utility function captures the
motivation to punish in proportion to the anger provoked by the updated belief




L (qˆ (t, k))
0.3
.
Levine’s prediction: the level of punishment at round t increases in
qˆ (t, k), the updated belief about first-mover’s selfishness after observing k low
shares out of t rounds.
Another theory of anger is Akerlof’s (2015) model of norm compliance.
Akerlof assumes that subjects can hold a sharing norm and expect their part-
ner to comply with the norm. Anger is then provoked by the extent to which
the partner fails to comply with it. Suppose the responders hold an equal
sharing norm that requires people to give xt = pit/2. Because pit is unknown
to the responder, he forms an expectation about the pot size, E (pit|xt, qˆ (t, k))
based on the share at round t and the updated belief about first-mover’s self-







, where (z)+ = max {z, 0}. The extent
to which the first-mover fails to comply with the equal sharing norm in giving
xt determines the extent to which the responder is provoked to anger. Thus,
we can write Akerlof’s function of anger at round t as
A
((





where A (0) = 0, A (y) > 0 and A′ (y) > 0 for y ∈ (0, 5]. If a first-mover gives
a high share of xt = 20 at round t, there will be no anger because a high share
is either an equal or favourable share to the responder. If a first-mover gives
a low share of xt = 10 at round t, a responder’s anger might be provoked and
increase as the expected level of first-mover’s non-compliance with the norm
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rises. This expected non-compliance,
E (pit|xt = 10, qˆ (t, k))
2
− 10 = 10qˆ (t, k)
(1 + qˆ (t, k))
,
is increasing in qˆ (t, k), meaning that the more selfish a first-mover is believed
to be, the more likely the first-mover would have given a low share out of a
large pot. The responder’s utility function is the same as equation (1.1) except
that Levine’s anger function is replaced by Akerlof’s anger function in (1.2).






, if xt = 10
0, if xt = 20
.
Akerlof ’s prediction: the level of punishment at round t depends on both
xt ∈ {10, 20}, whether a first-mover gives a high or low share at round t, and
qˆ (t, k), the updated belief about the first-mover’s selfishness after observing
k low shares out of t rounds. When the share at round t is low, punishment
increases in qˆ (t, k). When the share at round t is high, no punishment is used.
Both Levine and Akerlof can also predict the behaviour of not punishing
if L(y) and A(y) are assumed to be zero for all levels of anger. Otherwise, these
models predict that punishment is a function of qˆ (t, k), but they differ in the
impact of qˆ (t, k) on punishment when the first-mover gives a high share at
round t. This key difference allows us to test econometrically which model can
explain the punishment data better.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
We first investigate the impact of the first-movers’ past and current sharing
decisions on the responders’ punishment decision at round t. We estimate the
following panel data regression model:
pit = β0+β1(History of low shares)it+β2(Low share)it+αi+δt+ρiδt+ it,
(1.3)
where the dependent variable pit is the punishment unit chosen by responder
i at round t. The variable History of low shares at round t is the number of
low shares i’s first-mover gives in previous rounds divided by the number of
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previous rounds (t − 1). Since the observations in the first two rounds have
only one previous round or none, we include observations that have at least
two rounds of history, that is, observations in the last five rounds. The variable
Low share is a dummy indicating that a first-mover gives a low share at round
t, instead of a high share. We include subjects fixed effects αi as controls
for individual-specific characteristics and round fixed effects δt as controls for
each round of the experiment. To control for the effect of role reversal, we also
include additional round fixed effects ρiδt for subjects who played the role of
the responder after playing the role of the first-mover (ρi = 1).
The panel data fixed effects model captures within-subject variations,
while removing any between-subject variation. This is an appropriate model
for this experiment because our objective is to study how individuals respond
to the history of interacting with their partner over time. A detailed discussion
by Charness et al. (2012) on between-subject and within-subject designs also
pointed out that although there are potential confounds in multi-round games,
using fixed effects model can achieve consistency and is often able to test more
complex hypothesis for which between-subject design is not feasible.
Second, we test two theoretical predictions by Levine (1998) and Akerlof
(2015) regarding the role of the belief updated by Bayes’ rule about first-
mover’s selfishness. Given the assumption of uniform distribution of first-
mover’s types, we can compute all possible beliefs of qˆ (t, k), which is a function
of k number of low shares and t rounds. To test the effect of this Bayesian belief
on punishment, we estimate the following fixed effects panel data regression
model:
pit = γ0 + γ1qˆ(t, k)it × (High share)it + γ2qˆ(t, k)it × (Low share)it
+ αi + δt + ρiδt + it.
(1.4)
Note that a separate variable for the sharing decision at round t is not needed
in this equation because qˆ (t, k) already takes it into account. The coefficient
γ1 is interpreted as the extent to which the Bayesian belief about the first-
mover’s selfishness affects the level of punishment when a first-mover gives a
high share at round t. The coefficient γ2 indicates the impact of the Bayesian
belief about first-mover’s selfishness on the level of punishment when a first-
mover gives a low share at round t. According to Levine’s prediction that
people punish solely based on the updated belief about their partner’s type,
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Levine’s hypotheses are:
γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0.
According to Akerlof’s prediction that people punish according to the updated
belief about their partner’s selfishness only when their partner gives a low share
at round t, Akerlof’s hypotheses are:
γ1 = 0 and γ2 > 0.
1.6 Results
Table 1.1 provides the summary of statistics for key variables by rounds. 122
subjects participate in the experiment. In each round, the pot size is drawn
to be large about fifty percent of the time, but the percentage of first-movers
giving a low share is at least 73%. This percentage difference implies that a
substantial number of first-movers give a low share even when the pot is large.
About 50% to 59% of responders choose to punish in a given round, and about
47% to 66% of responders rate that they are at least a little angry with their
partner (Anger level ≥ 2). The responders on average estimate that about
60% to 70% of the time the first-mover would give a low share if the pot is
large in the next round.
The results are divided into three subsections. The first subsection
illustrates how the first-movers’ past and current sharing decisions might in-
fluence the responders’ punishment and then provides statistical analysis on
the determinants of punishment. To better understand the motivations behind
punishments, we also examine two self-report measures: the anger level with
the partner and the estimated likelihood that the partner would give selfishly.
Next, we test theoretical predictions on the effect of Bayesian updating about
the first-mover’s selfishness on punishment. Lastly, we show three identifiable
patterns of punishment and anger in the sample.
1.6.1 The History of Sharing Behaviour
To study the effect of the history of sharing behaviour on punishment at round
t, we create a variable called history of low shares to represent the past sharing
decisions up to t − 1 round, apart from the sharing decision at round t. A
history of low shares at round t is defined as the number of low shares a
13
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Rounds
Round t
Variables 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Pot size is large 50.8% 51.6% 49.2% 57.4% 42.6% 57.4% 45.1%
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Giving a low share 77.0% 83.6% 77.0% 73.0% 82.0% 80.3% 91.2%
(0.42) (0.37) (0.42) (0.45) (0.39) (0.40) (0.28)
Punishment unit 2.52 2.58 3.31 3.21 3.25 3.34 3.62
(3.09) (3.37) (3.77) (3.58) (3.66) (3.96) (3.93)
Punishment frequency 54.1% 50.0% 57.4% 56.6% 59.0% 53.3% 57.4%
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Anger level 1.86 2.14 2.37 2.53 2.70 2.82 3.10
(1.19) (1.39) (1.57) (1.79) (1.81) (1.87) (2.06)
Anger frequency 46.8% 53.3% 57.4% 54.9% 63.1% 63.1% 66.4%
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Likelihood of selfish share 60.3% 62.2% 60.8% 64.9% 68.0% 68.0% 69.6%
(0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.28)
History of low shares 77.0% 80.3% 79.2% 77.7% 78.5% 78.8%
(0.42) (0.29) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19)
Subjects 122
Notes: In the first round, the pot size is large (pi = 40) 50.8% of the time (as opposed
to pi = 20), and the first-movers give a low share (x = 10) 77.0% of the time (as opposed
to x = 20). The responders choose on average 2.52 punishment units in the first round.
Punishment frequency refers the percentage of subjects who choose a punishment that is at
least one unit (p ≥ 1). After observing the share a first-mover gives at round t, the responder
indicates the level of anger on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Anger frequency refers the percentage of subjects who report at least a little angry with their
partner (Anger level ≥ 2). The variable likelihood of selfish share refers to the responder’s
estimated likelihood that the partner would give a low share if the pot is large in the next
round. The variable history of low shares at round t is defined as the number of low shares
the responder received in previous rounds divided by the number of previous rounds (t − 1).
Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
first-mover gives to a responder in previous rounds divided by the number of
previous rounds (t − 1). Put simply, it is a fraction of low shares in previous
rounds. This variable measures the degree of the lack of generosity the first-
mover has shown to the responder in the past. Take the third round for
example. Eighty subjects have a 100% history of low shares because there
were two low shares in the first two rounds, thirty-six subjects who observed
exactly one low share in the two previous rounds have a 50% history of low
shares, and six subjects who observed no low shares have a 0% history of low
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shares. Table 1.2 presents the distribution of the history of the low shares by
rounds.
Table 1.2: Distribution of Responders Based on the History
of Low Shares Received
Number of subjects
History of Round t
low shares 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th












0% 28 6 3 2 0 0
Notes: A history of low shares at round t is defined as the number of
low shares a responder receives from a first-mover in previous rounds
divided by the number of previous rounds. In each round, the num-
bers in a column sum up to 122 subjects. Take the second round for
example: 94 subjects have a 100% history of low shares because there
was one low share in the first round, and 28 subjects have a 0% history
of low shares because there was no low share. This variable represents
the degree of the lack of generosity that a first-mover has shown to a
responder in the past. The first round is omitted because it has no
history.
Figure 1.2a illustrates the relationship between the first-movers’ sharing
decisions and the responders’ punishment. Observations are divided into four
categories based on the variable History of low shares, which is the number of
low shares a responder received from a first-mover in previous rounds divided
by the number of previous rounds. If a subject at round t received low shares
less than 60% of the time in the past t− 1 rounds, this observation falls into
the first category with a label of ‘0%-’. If a subject at round t received low
shares at least 60% and less than 80% of the time in the past t − 1 rounds,
this observation falls into the second category with a label of ‘60%-’. The left
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section of the figure includes observations at round t in which the first-mover
gives a high share. The right section is when the first-mover gives a low share
at round t. Figure 1.2a suggests that the responders tend to inflict a harsher
punishment when they receive a low share at round t than when they receive
a high share. Moreover, a higher percentage of low shares in previous rounds
seems to increase the severity of punishment, but formal statistical analysis is
required to test this effect.
Some individuals may not be willing to pay the cost for inflicting pun-
ishment, though they still feel angry. To measure this feeling of anger, subjects
are asked to rate how angry they are with their partner at the end of each
round. We aim to check whether the history of low shares has the same impact
on anger level as they would on punishment level. Figure 1.2b has the same
categories as in Figure 1.2a except that the punishment variable is replaced by
the anger variable. A comparison of the two sections of Figure 1.2b suggests
that the responders tend to report a higher level of anger at round t when they
receive a low share than when they receive a high share. Given that subjects
receive a low share at round t as in the right section of Figure 1.2b, there
seems to be a slight upward trend between the anger level and the percentage
of low shares in previous rounds.
We are also interested in how the responders’ estimated likelihood about
their partner’s future sharing behaviour is affected by their partner’s past and
current sharing decisions. Figure 1.2c uses the variable Likelihood of selfish
share, which is the responder’s estimated likelihood that the first-mover would
give a low share if the pot is large in the next round. Figure 1.2c also suggests
that a higher percentage of low shares in previous rounds seems to increase the
responder’s estimation about the likelihood of the first-mover sharing selfishly,
especially when the first-mover gives a low share at round t.
To provide statistical evidence that history matters for punishment,
column 1 of Table 1.3 estimates the fixed effects panel data regression in equa-
tion (1.3). The point estimate on Low share in the second row means that the
responders punish on average 1.8 units more when they receive a low share
at round t than when they receive a high share. In the first row, the point
estimate on History of low shares is positive and significant at 1% level after
controlling for the effect of receiving a low share at round t, subject fixed ef-
fects, round fixed effects and the interaction terms between the dummy for role
reversal and the round dummies. Thus, a higher proportion of low shares that
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Figure 1.2: The Effects of the First-movers’ Past and Current Sharing Deci-
sions on the Responders’ Punishment Decisions, Feelings of Anger, and Esti-
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High share at round t Low share at round t
(c) Average Estimate of How Selfish the First-mover































History of low shares: % of low shares in previous rounds
High share at round t Low share at round t
Notes: (a) The responder’s
punishment ranges from zero
to ten units. A ‘0%-’ history
of low shares refers to ob-
servations in which the first-
mover gives low shares less
than 60% of the time in all
previous rounds. A ‘60%-’
history of low shares refers to
at least 60% and less than
80% of the low shares in pre-
vious rounds. The left (right)
section of the figure includes
observations at round t in
which the first-mover gives a
high (low) share. When the
first-mover gives a high share
at round t, the number of ob-
servations for each of these
four categories of the history
of low shares from ‘0%-’ to
‘100%’: N = 33, 21, 18, 45.
When the first-mover gives
a low share at round t, the
number of observations for
each of these four categories:
N = 72, 128, 78, 215. All
610 observations have at least
two rounds of history of play
for all subjects. Error bars
are twice the standard error
of the mean, approximating
95% confidence interval. (b)
The responder’s anger level
ranges from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (very much). (c) The
responder’s estimated like-
lihood that the first-mover
would give a low share if the
pot is large in the next round.
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the first-mover gives in previous t− 1 rounds causes the responder to increase
the level of punishment at round t, holding constant whether the first-mover
gives a high or low share at round t. This effect of history on punishment re-
mains positive and significant at 1% level even if we include only observations
that have at least three rounds of history of play for all subjects.
Column 2 of Table 1.3 uses the level of anger as the dependent variable
in estimating equation (1.3). We find the same effect that the coefficient
on History of low shares is significant and positive, suggesting that a higher
Table 1.3: The Impact of the First-movers’ Sharing Behaviour on the
Responders’ Punishment Decisions, Feelings of Anger, and Estimates
of How Selfish the Partner Might Be in the Future
Dependent Variable: Punishment Anger Likelihood of
selfish share
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
History of low shares 2.870*** 1.529*** 0.354***
(1.007) (0.483) (0.123)
Low share 1.816*** 1.515*** 0.0907**
(0.466) (0.183) (0.0398)
Constant -0.504 -0.883* 0.283**
(0.990) (0.503) (0.127)
Subject FE YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Role Reversal × Round FE YES YES YES
Observations 610 610 610
Subjects 122 122 122
R2 0.073 0.271 0.082
Notes: Estimates from panel data fixed effects model. The dependent variable in
column 1 is the level of punishment ranging from zero to ten units. The dependent
variable in column 2 is the reported anger level with the partner, and the scale is
adjusted to take values from zero (not at all) to six (very much). The dependent
variable in column 3 is the responder’s estimated likelihood that the partner would
give a low share if the pot is large in the next round. The variable Low share is a
dummy indicating that the first-mover gives a low share at round t. The variable
History of low shares is defined as the number of low shares a first-mover gives
in previous t − 1 rounds divided by t − 1. All observations have at least two
rounds of history of play for all subjects. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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proportion of low shares that a first-mover gives in previous rounds causes a
responder to report a higher level of anger. In column 3, the dependent variable
is the responders’ estimated likelihood that the first-mover would give a low
share when the pot is large in the next round. Again, we find that the history
of low shares significantly increases the responders’ estimated likelihood of how
selfish their partner might be in the future.
1.6.2 A Test of Two Theories: Spitefulness and Norm
Compliance
The evidence so far suggests that the responders base their punishment de-
cisions not only on how much the first-mover gives at round t but also all
sharing decisions in previous t− 1 rounds. This is true also for how angry the
responders report to be and for how much they estimate about their partner’s
future selfish behaviour. Now we further investigate whether these effects of
past and current sharing decisions can be explained by the responders up-
dating their belief about the first-mover’s selfishness by Bayes’ rule. The key
variable is qˆ (t, k), which is the expected belief about the partner’s probability
of behaving selfishly after observing k number of low shares out of t rounds.
Table 1.4 tabulates all possible values of qˆ (t, k) by t rounds and by k number
of low shares.
Our aim is to econometrically test two theoretical predictions regarding
the effect of qˆ (t, k) on punishment. This effect is examined separately depend-
ing on whether the first-mover gives a high or low share at round t. When
the first-mover gives a low share at round t, both Levine (1998) and Akerlof
(2015) predict that qˆ (t, k) will have a positive effect on punishment, that is,
γ2 > 0 in equation (1.4); this common hypothesis states that the responders
choose a harsher punishment if they have a stronger belief about the partner’s
selfishness based on Bayes’ rule. When the first-mover gives a high share at
round t, Levine predicts γ1 > 0 while Akerlof predicts that γ1 = 0. Thus, the
sign and significance of γ1 allow us to discriminate between the two theories.
Column 1 of Table 1.5 tests these predictions by estimating the fixed
effects panel data regression in equation (1.4). The estimate on γ2 is positive
and significant (p = 0.040), suggesting that when the first-mover gives a low
share at round t, the responders tend to increase the level of punishment in
proportion to the extent of the Bayesian belief about their partner’s selfishness.
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Table 1.4: The Responder’s Belief Updated by Bayes’ Rule About the First-
mover’s Selfishness
# of low shares The Bayesian belief about first-mover’s selfishness at round t:
out of t rounds: qˆ (t, k) = E (q|B(t) = k)
B (t) = k 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
0 0.333 0.250 0.200 0.167 0.143 0.125 0.111
1 0.556 0.375 0.280 0.222 0.184 0.156 0.136
2 0.607 0.418 0.313 0.247 0.203 0.171
3 0.653 0.462 0.347 0.273 0.223
4 0.694 0.504 0.383 0.302
5 0.728 0.544 0.419
6 0.757 0.581
7 0.781
Notes: The first-movers are assumed to have a continuum of types distributed uniformly
on [0, 1]. A first-mover of type q ∈ [0, 1] behaves selfishly with probability q (giving a low
share regardless of the pot size) and behaves fairly with probability 1− q (giving an equal
share of the pot, whether large or small). The responder’s prior expectation about the
first-mover’s selfishness is E(q) = 0.5. After observing k number of low shares out of t
rounds, the responder’s posterior expectation about the first-mover’s selfishness is qˆ (t, k).
In contrast, the estimate on γ1 is not significantly different from zero (p =
0.571), implying that when the first-mover gives a high share at round t, a
stronger Bayesian belief about the first-mover’s selfishness does not lead to
a harsher punishment. These results confirm that Akerlof’s model of norm
compliance fits the data better than Levine’s model of spitefulness. Therefore,
people are likely to evaluate their partner’s current action against a certain
sharing norm, in addition to evaluating their partner’s selfishness based on
past and current sharing decisions.
We also test these theoretical predictions with regard to the responder’s
level of anger. Column 2 of Table 1.5 uses the anger level as the dependent
variable to estimate equation (1.4) . The results are similar to those in column
1 of Table 1.5. The estimate on qˆ (t, k) × High share is not significant (p =
0.461), while the estimate on qˆ (t, k) × Low share is positive and significant
(p < 0.001). This further confirms Akerlof’s model that anger is potentially
triggered by the extent to which a current action fails to comply with the equal
sharing norm. A stronger Bayesian belief about the first-mover’s selfishness
leads the responder to believe that a low share given by the first-mover is more
likely to be a selfish share than an equal share.
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Table 1.5: The Role of the Belief Updated by Bayes’ Rule on the
Responders’ Punishment Decisions, Feelings of Anger, and Esimates
of How Selfish the Partner Might Be in the Future
Dependent Variable: Punishment Anger Likelihood of
selfish share
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
qˆ (t, k)×High share 1.426 0.807 0.687***
(2.510) (1.091) (0.239)
qˆ (t, k)× Low share 4.093** 3.271*** 0.700***
(1.976) (0.907) (0.216)
Constant 1.433 0.356 0.311**
(1.126) (0.502) (0.122)
Subject FE YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Role Reversal × Round FE YES YES YES
Observations 610 610 610
Subjects 122 122 122
R2 0.062 0.249 0.095
Notes: Estimates from panel data fixed effects model. The dependent variable
in column 1 is the level of punishment ranging from zero to ten units. The
dependent variable in column 2 is the reported anger level with the partner, and
the scale is adjusted to take values from zero (not at all) to six (very much). The
dependent variable in column 3 is the responder’s estimated likelihood that the
partner would give a low share if the pot is large in the next round. The variable
qˆ (t, k) is the responder’s expected probability of the first-mover behaving selfishly
after receiving k low offers out of t rounds. The variable High share (Low share)
is a dummy indicating that a first-mover gives a high (low) share at round t. All
observations have at least two rounds of history of play for all subjects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Column 3 of Table 1.5 checks whether the belief updated by Bayes’ rule
can predict the responder’s estimated likelihood that the first-mover would
give a low share if the pot is large in the next round. Notably, the coefficient
on qˆ (t, k)×High share is positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting that
when the first-mover gives a high share at round t, the responder’s estimated
likelihood about the first-mover future selfish behaviour is still in direct pro-
portion to qˆ (t, k). Moreover, this coefficient is not significantly different from
the positive coefficient on qˆ (t, k) × Low share (p = 0.836); thus, the respon-
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ders estimate the likelihood of their partner’s future selfish behaviour in a way
that is similar to Bayesian updating, regardless of whether their partner gives
a high or low share at round t.
A crucial point is that whether the current sharing decision has a medi-
ating effect on the impact of qˆ (t, k) on the dependent variable in Table 1.5. In
column 3 of Table 1.5, there is no mediating effect because the estimated like-
lihood of the first-mover’s future selfish behaviour is similar to the updated
belief by Bayes’ rule, which has already taken into account both past and
current sharing decisions. In contrast, column 1 of Table 1.5 shows that the
current sharing decision does have a significant mediating effect on the impact
of qˆ (t, k) on punishment decisions (H0 : γ1 = γ2; p = 0.027). This finding is
predicted by Akerlof’s model of norm compliance, which pays more attention
to the partner’s current action than the belief about the partner’s type.
1.6.3 Individual Heterogeneity in Punishment Decisions
Recent experiments found that the tendency to punish differs considerably
across individuals and found support for identifying different types of punish-
ers (Carpenter, 2007; Anderson & Putterman, 2006). In our experiment, we
identify three basic groups of players based on two dimensions of contingent
decisions. In one dimension which concerns the case when the first-mover gives
a low share, players are sorted by the number of times they choose to punish
their partner over the seven rounds in a game. On one end of this dimension,
those who never punish in a game are defined as non-punishers.5 Those who
punish at least once for receiving a low share over the second rounds are called
punishers. These punishers are then sorted in the second dimension, which
concerns the case when the first-mover gives a high share, by the number of
times they choose to punish their partner over the seven rounds in a game
(see Appendix B for more detail). We identify those who punish more than
once for receiving a high share as excessive punishers. The rest are moderate
punishers because they choose zero punishment for receiving a high share at
least six times out of seven rounds.
The distribution of these three groups of players is as follows: 26.2% are
non-punishers, 32.0% are moderate punishers, and 41.8% are excessive pun-
ishers. Note that this classification is based on the frequency of punishing,
5In the case when their partner gives a high share, all non-punishers (except one) never
punish their partner. This exception has only one positive punishment out of seven rounds.
22
not on the level of chosen punishment. Thus, excessive punishers do not nec-
essarily inflict higher levels of punishment; they only punish more frequently
than moderate punishers when they are given a high share. To understand
their punishment behaviour, subjects were asked to explain why they made
the decisions they made in a questionnaire at the end of the experiment. A
few subjects appeared to be confused with the experiment, while others might
want to revenge because they felt that they were taken advantage in previous
rounds.
Table 1.6: Punishers Are More Likely to Give than Non-punishers
Dependent Variable: Give high share ∈ {0, 1}
Logit OLS
Independent Variables (1) (2)
Moderate punishers 0.097** 0.113***
(0.038) (0.041)
Excessive punishers 0.096*** 0.111***
(0.032) (0.036)




Round FE YES YES




Notes: Column 1 reports the marginal effects for logit model, and column 2
reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is a first-mover’s decision to
give a high share or not at round t. These first-movers are classified into three
groups based on their punishment decisions when they play the role of the
responder. The default group is non-punishers. The binary variable Moderate
punishers indicates whether a first-mover is a moderate punisher. The binary
variable Excessive punishers indicates whether a first-mover is an excessive
punisher. The dummy variable Large pot size indicates whether the pot size
at round t is large. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Since every subject plays a game as the responder and another as the
first-mover, we can assess whether these three identified groups behave differ-
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ently when they are put in the role to give. We suspect that punishers, who
might hold a sharing norm, are more likely to give a high share to others than
non-punishers. Indeed, we find that 46.9% of non-punishers give a high share
at least once out seven rounds, while this percentage is 82.1% for moderate
punishers and 78.4% for excessive punishers. Both types are punishers are
significantly more likely to give high shares than non-punishers (Fisher’s exact
test, p = 0.001).
Regression analysis also suggests that the motivation to punish is posi-
tively correlated with the motivation to give. Table 1.6 regresses a first-mover’s
decision to give a high share at round t on three binary variables, round fixed
effects and interaction terms between a role reversal dummy and round dum-
mies. The first variable Moderate punishers indicates whether a first-mover is
identified as a moderate punisher when playing the role of the responder. The
second variable Excessive punishers indicates whether a first-mover is an ex-
cessive punisher. The default group is thus non-punishers. The third variable
Large pot size indicates whether the pot size at round t is large. Column 1 of
Table 1.6 reports the marginal effects on giving a high share in logit model.
The coefficients on Moderate punishers and Excessive punishers are both pos-
itive and significant, suggesting that both moderate and excessive punishers
are about 9.7 percentage points more likely to give a high share than a non-
punisher. The positive and significant coefficient on Large pot size means that
the first-movers are 17.8 percentage points more likely to give a high share if
the pot at round t is large, rather than small.
By definition, excessive punishers are more prone than moderate pun-
ishers to punish a partner who gives a high share. Moderate punishers behave
in a way that is similar to Akerlof’s prediction that people would refrain from
inflicting punishment whenever their partner gives a high share in the current
round. On the other hand, excessive punishers might punish a partner who
gives a high share because of Levine’s reasoning, that is, the partner is believed
to be a selfish person. Table 1.7 tests these conjectures by estimating equation
(1.4) separately for moderate punishers in column 1 and for excessive punish-
ers in column 2. As expected, column 1 shows an insignificant coefficient of
γ1 and a significantly positive coefficient of γ2 (p = 0.037), suggesting that
moderate punishers follow Akerlof’s model of norm compliance. Surprisingly,
column 2 of Table 1.7 shows that both coefficients of γ1 and γ2 are insignif-
icantly different from zero, suggesting that excessive punishers do not follow
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Levine’s model of spitefulness. On the contrary, the constant term (p = 0.040)
in column 2 indicates that excessive punishers choose an average punishment
as high as 4.3 units, even if their updated belief by Bayes’ rule indicates that
the first-mover is not a selfish person at all (qˆ(t, k) = 0). Despite high level
and frequency of punishment, excessive punishers do not punish a partner
more because the partner is more likely to be a selfish person.
Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects of Bayesian Updating on Punishment and
Anger
Dependent Variable: Punishment Anger
Moderate Excessive Non- Moderate Excessive
Punishers Punishers Punishers Punishers Punishers
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
qˆ (t, k)×High share 1.407 2.410 3.960* 2.252 -2.758*
(4.916) (4.540) (2.003) (1.612) (1.389)
qˆ (t, k)× Low share 8.547** 3.537 5.969*** 5.243*** -0.157
(3.963) (3.605) (1.762) (1.342) (1.033)
Constant -1.193 4.314** -2.264** -0.087 2.388***
(2.135) (2.048) (1.039) (0.701) (0.546)
Subject FE YES YES YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES YES YES
Role Rev. × Round FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 195 255 160 195 255
Subjects 39 51 32 39 51
R2 0.217 0.046 0.355 0.451 0.163
Notes: Estimates from panel data fixed effects model. For columns 1 and 2, the dependent
variable is the level of punishment ranging from zero to ten units. For columns 3 to 5, the
dependent variable is the responder’s anger level, and the scale is adjusted to take values
from zero (not at all) to six (very much). The variable qˆ (t, k) is the responder’s expected
probability of the first-mover behaving selfishly after receiving k low offers out of t rounds.
The variable High share (Low share) is a dummy indicating that the first-mover gives a
high (low) share at round t. All observations have at least two rounds of history of play
for all subjects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 1.7 estimate equation (1.4) while using the
responder’s anger level as the dependent variable for all three groups of sub-
jects. We can estimate on the subsample of non-punishers because they could
potentially report that they are angry with their partner even though they
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effects of Bayesian Updating on the
Responders’ Estimates of How Selfish the Partner Might Be in
the Future
Dependent Variable: Likelihood of selfish share
Non- Moderate Excessive
Punishers Punishers Punishers
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
qˆ (t, k)×High share 0.358 1.534*** 0.246
(0.504) (0.325) (0.371)
qˆ (t, k)× Low share 0.352 1.457*** 0.330
(0.517) (0.283) (0.301)
Constant 0.542* -0.123 0.508***
(0.307) (0.156) (0.167)
Subject FE YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Role Reversal × Round FE YES YES YES
Observations 160 195 255
Subjects 32 39 51
R2 0.069 0.254 0.091
Notes: Estimates from panel data fixed effects model. The dependent vari-
able is the responder’s estimated likelihood that the first-mover would give
a low share if the pot is large in the next round. The variable qˆ (t, k) is the
responder’s expected probability of the first-mover behaving selfishly after
receiving k low offers out of t rounds. The variable High share (Low share)
is a dummy indicating that the first-mover gives a high (low) share at round
t. All observations have at least two rounds of history of play for all subjects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
never punish. One possible reason for not punishing is that non-punishers do
not think others have a duty to give a high share, so no anger is triggered
if receiving a low share. However, in column 3 of Table 1.7 the positive and
significant coefficient on qˆ(t, k) × Low share (p = 0.002) suggests that non-
punishers still report a higher level of anger in response to a stronger Bayesian
belief about their partner’s selfishness, when their partner gives a low share
at round t. Notably, the coefficient on qˆ(t, k) × High share is positive and
marginally significant (p = 0.057); thus, receiving a high share from the part-
ner at round t does not necessarily stop non-punishers from reporting higher
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levels of anger in response to a stronger Bayesian belief about the partners’
selfishness. In contrast, this effect of qˆ(t, k) × High share on anger is not
present with either moderate or excessive punishers in column 4 or 5 of Table
1.7. The reason for the difference between non-punishers and punishers might
be that the use of punishment in a given round is able to mitigate the anger
provoked in that round. Hence, if anger was provoked in previous rounds for
non-punishers, this anger could be built up and remain high even when the
partner gives a high share in the current round.
Another interesting difference between groups is found in the respon-
der’s estimated likelihood that their partner would give a low share if the
pot is large in the next round. Table 1.8 uses this estimated likelihood as
the dependent variable to separately estimate equation (1.4) for each of the
three groups. Remarkably, only moderate punishers in column 2 tend to give
a higher estimate that their partner might behave selfishly in response to a
stronger Bayesian belief about the partner’s selfishness. In contrast, both non-
punishers in column 1 and excessive punishers in column 3 appear to be quite
unresponsive in their estimated likelihood to the strength of Bayesian belief.
This again confirms that excessive punishers do not think or behave in a way
described in Levine’s model of spitefulness.
In summary, we discover in our sample three distinct patterns of pun-
ishment and anger in response to the belief updated by Bayes’ rule about the
partner’s selfishness. First, non-punishers tend to escalate their anger in spite
of never choosing to punish. Second, moderate punishers tend to escalate
anger and punishments only when their partner gives a low share. Third, the
punishments and anger of excessive punishers display no escalating pattern,
despite the high level and frequency of their punishment.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents an experiment that explores the factors can explain
how much people punish potential transgressors in a multi-round game. The
design eliminates any material incentives for inflicting punishment, such as
the benefits gained by building a reputation as a tough punisher. Hence, the
motivation to punish must be something intrinsic. Our results provide the
first experimental evidence that people tend to choose a harsher punishment
in response to a higher proportion of low shares their partner gives in previous
27
rounds. Analysis of the responder’s level of anger reveals a similar escalating
pattern as in the responder’s punishment decisions. This finding suggests that
the human emotion of anger can have a cumulative effect on how people punish
a repeat transgressor. Also, the escalating anger can potentially be one of the
driving forces behind the widespread legislations of graduated sanctions.
Our data provide further evidence concerning the role of the respon-
der’s belief updated by Bayes’ theorem about the first-mover’s selfishness in
punishment decisions. We find more support for the theory of norm compli-
ance (Akerlof, 2015) that predicts people punish according to the extent to
which the partner’s action fails to comply with a sharing norm than for the
theory of spitefulness (Levine, 1998) that predicts people punish a spiteful
person regardless of the partner’s current action. This evidence suggests that
cumulative anger can be explained by the updated belief about how much an
action fails to comply with the norm.
We also find that individuals differ in the extent of internalizing the
sharing norm and identify three patterns of behaviour. First, a third of sub-
jects punish an action that potentially fails to comply with the norm. Second,
a quarter of subjects never punish yet may still get angry. Third, the rest
punish indiscriminately a selfish or non-selfish partner. Moreover, internaliz-
ing a sharing norm affects both how one behaves and how one expects others
to behave. Punishers are found to be more likely to give in compliance with
the sharing norm than non-punishers. Therefore, future research, whether
theoretical or empirical, should pay more attention to the extent of norm in-
ternalization across individuals.
This experiment not only demonstrates that emotions can influence eco-
nomic decisions but also discriminates between different economic models of
anger. More experimental works can be done to examine how anger evolves
through time in response to receiving new information and the economic con-
sequences of accumulated or mitigated anger.
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1.8 Appendix A: Experimental Instructions
Welcome to this study of decision-making. The experiment will take about 60
minutes. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you
can earn up to £6.6 You will be earning ‘experimental currency units’ (ECUs),
which will be converted to pound sterling at the rate of 1 ECU = £0.01. All
the money you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, in cash, in
private, after the experiment ends. Your confidentiality is assured.
You will be randomly matched with another participant. Your earnings
will depend on your decisions and his/her decisions. You will not know their
identity in any given decision period or after the experiment is over, and they
will not know yours.
You will be assigned one of two roles: the first-mover or the responder.
You will interact with the same participant for 7 periods. Each period has two
stages.
In the first stage, the first-mover will be asked to split a pot of money
between the two. The pot size will be either 20 or 40 ECUs. Each with
50% chance. The responder will not observe the exact pot size, but the first-
mover will. The first-mover can only choose to share either 10 or 20 with the
responder, while keeping the rest of the pot for himself. For example, if he
shares 10 with the responder, he keeps 10 when the pot is 20 or keeps 30 when
the pot is 40.
If the responder receives: 10 20
When the pot is 20, the first-mover keeps: 10 0
When the pot is 40, the first-mover keeps: 30 20
In the second stage, the responder will have the option to reduce the
first-mover’s earnings. The amount of reduction can be between 0 and 10
ECUs. Every 1 ECU reduction will cost the responder 0.3 ECUs. For exam-
ple, if the responder reduces first-mover’s earnings by 9 ECUs, it costs the
responder (0.3)(9) = 2.7 ECUs. The first-mover will not observe how much
his earnings have been reduced until the end of the experiment.
If first-mover gets a reduction of: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
then it will cost the responder: 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3
6In three out of five sessions, the instructions say that ‘you can earn up to £8’. This is
due to miscalculation. In our analysis we still pool the five sessions together because the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that we cannot reject equality of the two distributions.
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Before seeing the share in each period, the responder needs to indicate
how much he would like to reduce the first-mover’s earnings both for the case
when the share is 10 and when the share is 20. Of course, only one of the two
cases would have been selected by the first-mover, so only in this specific case
the choice of reduction will affect earnings.
You will answer a few comprehension questions. These are purely for
your understanding of the procedures, so your answers will not affect your
payment.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. Once the experiment
begins, there will be no further discussion, and no communication of any kind
among the participants is permitted.
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1.9 Appendix B: Additional Analysis
In section 1.4, the assumption that the first-movers’ types are uniformly dis-
tributed between zero and one implies that a large portion of people behave
fairly some of the time and behave selfishly some of the time. To see if this
is true in our experiment, we can look at the number of times a large pot
is randomly drawn over seven rounds and the number of times a first-mover
gives a low share conditional on the pot being large. Table 1.9 shows the dis-
tribution of first-movers based on these two variables. Only 6.6% of subjects
behave fairly by giving a high share whenever the pot is large, corresponding
to type q = 0. About 40% behave selfishly by giving a low share whenever
the pot is large, corresponding to type q = 1. Over 50% of subjects fall into
the category of 0 < q < 1, rendering support for the assumption that many
people are partially fair and partially selfish.
Table 1.9: Distribution of First-movers by the Number of Large
Pots and the Number of Low Shares Given Large Pots (%)
Number of Low Shares Given Large Pots
Number of
Large Pots 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1 0.8 3.3 4.1
2 1.7 6.6 7.4 15.7
3 0.8 5.0 14.0 9.9 29.8
4 2.5 0.8 7.4 5.0 9.1 24.8
5 0.8 0.8 1.7 4.1 4.1 9.1 20.7
6 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.7 0.0 0.8 1.7 5.0
Total 6.6 16.5 31.4 20.7 13.2 9.9 1.7 100.0
Notes: The row variable of the contingency table is the number of large
pots that are randomly drawn over seven rounds. The column variable is the
number of low shares chosen by the first-mover conditional on the pot being
large. For example, in the case where three large pots were drawn out of seven
rounds, 0.8% never gave a low share, 5.0% gave one low share, 14.0% gave two
low shares, and 9.9% gave three low shares. One subject happened to observe
zero large pots over seven rounds, so it was not possible to analyse how fair
his decisions were, and thus he was excluded.
In section 1.6, we use panel data fixed effects model to estimate the
determinants of subject’s reported anger. The advantage is that it controls
for all the unobserved individual heterogeneity, but it does not account for the
ordinal nature of the dependent variable. To address this issue, we use random
effects ordered logit estimation, and Table 1.10 reports these results.
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Table 1.10: Random Effects Ordered Logit Model on Reported Anger
Dependent Variable: Non- Moderate Excessive
Anger All All Punishers Punishers Punishers
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




qˆ (t, k)×High share -3.063 -2.722 -7.232 -4.931*
(2.432) (10.25) (7.400) (2.683)
qˆ (t, k)× Low share 5.430*** 12.96 9.546*** 0.918
(1.741) (7.930) (3.021) (1.983)
Round FE YES YES YES YES YES
Role Rev. × Round FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 610 610 160 195 255
Subjects 122 122 32 39 51
Notes: Estimates are from random effects ordered logit model. The dependent variable
is the reported anger level with the partner on a scale from one (not at all) to seven
(very much). The variable qˆ (t, k) is the expected probability of the first-mover behaving
selfishly after receiving k low offers out of t rounds. The variable High share is a dummy
indicating that the first-mover gives a high share at round t. The variable Low share
is one minus High share. All observations have at least two rounds of history of play.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In section 1.6.3, we identify three types of punishers based on subjects’
contingent punishment decisions. Table 1.11 shows a detailed distribution of
responders by the number of times they choose to punish conditional on the
two cases of giving low and high shares. According to the previous definition,
the first row represents the non-punishers because they never punished when
receiving a low share. Among those who punished at least once when receiving
a low share, namely the second row onwards, the first two columns represent
the moderate punishers, and the rest of the columns represent the excessive
punishers.
Next, I present evidence that the order of playing a given role does
not have a significant effect on the subjects’ decisions. Table 1.12 first shows
that the frequency of giving a low share is not significantly different between
subjects who play the first-mover as the first role or the second role in all
rounds except the second and the sixth rounds at 10% level. The second half
of Table 1.12 shows that the punishment distribution in each round for subjects
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Table 1.11: Distribution of Responders by the Number of Decisions to Punish
Conditional on Low Share and on High Share (%)
# Punish Number of Decisions to Punish Conditional on High Share
Conditional on
Low Share 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 25.4 0.8 26.2
1 4.1 0.8 4.9
2 0.8 1.6 0.8 3.3
3 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.0 4.1
4 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.3
5 1.6 4.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.8 8.2
6 3.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.8 1.6 9.0
7 4.9 3.3 3.3 2.5 0.8 0.8 3.3 22.1 41.0
Total 45.1 13.1 4.9 4.1 1.6 3.3 4.1 23.8 100.0
Notes: The row variable of the contingency table is the number of decisions to punish over
the seven rounds conditional on receiving a low share. The column variable is the number
of decisions to punish over the same seven rounds conditional on receiving a high share.
Subjects in the first row are non-punishers because they never punished when receiving
a low share. Among those who punished at least once when receiving a low share, the
first two columns constitute moderate punishers and the rest of the columns constitute
excessive punishers.
whose first role is the responder is essentially the same as the distribution for
subjects whose second role is the responder.
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Table 1.12: No Evidence of Order Effects on Both Giving and
Punishment Behaviour
Give Low Share p-value
First Role is Second role is Chi-square
Round First-mover First-mover Test
1st 73.8% 80.3% 0.39
(0.44) (0.40)
2nd 77.0% 90.2% 0.05
(0.42) (0.30)
3rd 80.3% 73.8% 0.39
(0.40) (0.44)
4th 77.0% 68.9% 0.31
(0.42) (0.47)
5th 80.3% 83.6% 0.64
(0.40) (0.37)
6th 88.5% 72.1% 0.02
(0.32) (0.45)
7th 95.1% 88.5% 0.19
(0.22) (0.32)
Average Punishment p-value
First Role is Second role is Mann-
Round Responder Responder Whitney Test
1st 2.48 2.56 0.62
(0.41) (0.38)
2nd 2.95 2.21 0.31
(0.47) (0.39)
3rd 3.69 2.93 0.37
(0.51) (0.45)
4th 3.21 3.21 0.87
(0.44) (0.48)
5th 3.54 2.97 0.37
(0.48) (0.46)
6th 3.31 3.38 0.78
(0.51) (0.51)
7th 4.15 3.10 0.13
(0.52) (0.47)
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The null hypothesis of a chi-
square test is that playing the first-mover as the first role or the second role
has no effect on subjects’ decisions to give a low share in a given round.
The Mann-Whitney test hypothesizes that the punishment distribution is
identical for the two groups of responders.
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1.10 Appendix C: Screenshots
Figure 1.3: This screenshot displays what a first-mover might see in a given
round. The pot is randomly drawn to large (40 ECUs) or small (20 ECUs),
and the first-mover decides to give a low share (10 ECUs) or high share (20
ECUs) to the responder.
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Figure 1.4: This screenshot displays what a responder might see in a given
round. The responder decides in the case when his partner gives a low share
(10 ECUs) how much he or she would like to reduce the partner’s earnings.
The table at the top shows how much the partner shared in three previous
rounds and how much punishments were used.
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Figure 1.5: This screenshot displays a second screen a responder might see in
a given round. The responder decides in the case when the partner gives a
high share (20 ECUs) how much he or she would like to reduce the partner’s
earnings. The table at the top shows how much the partner shared in three
previous rounds and how much punishments were used.
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Figure 1.6: This screenshot displays a third screen a responder might see in a
given round. The responder is shown whether his partner gives a low or high
share. The responder then answers two questions on anger. The first one is
‘How angry are you with the share your received?’ The second one is ‘How
angry are you at the first-mover?’ The table at the top shows how much the




Figure 1.7: This screenshot displays a fourth screen a responder might see in
round 4. The responder indicates two likelihood estimations. The first one is
‘Given the share your received, what is your best estimate of the likelihood
that the pot size this period is 40?’ The second one is ‘Assume the pot size is 40
next period. What is your best estimate of the likelihood that the first-mover
will share 10 with you?’ The table at the top shows how much the partner




Intuition and Deliberation in
Giving and Punishment
2.1 Introduction
Altruistic giving and punishing norm violators are important social and eco-
nomic phenomena. In particular, evidence shows that the opportunity of pun-
ishment can increase social cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2000a). However,
people tend to punish less when the cost of punishing rises, and individuals
differ in the extent to which they respond to changes in the cost of punishing
(Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Some punish despite hav-
ing to pay a high cost of punishing, while others are quite sensitive to any
changes in punishment cost. This study explores whether the way people pro-
cess information can explain the individual differences in altruistic giving and
punishment.
Prior research has studied the effect of response time in reaching a
decision on the decision itself (e.g. Rand et al. , 2012; Sutter et al. , 2003).
Some studies use the ultimatum game, in which a proposer makes an offer
on how to split a sum of money with a responder, and the responder can
then decide to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both parties
divide the money according to the proposed offer; if rejected, both parties get
nothing. Rejecting a low offer is a way to punish the proposer although the
responder also incurs a cost of not accepting the offer. Evidence has shown
that the rate of punishment increases under time pressure (Sutter et al. , 2003)
and decreases when decisions are delayed (Grimm & Mengel, 2011), suggesting
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that punishing is driven by fast and intuitive thinking and reduced by slow and
deliberate thinking. However, Rubinstein (2007) found that the response time
of those who accepted a low offer was remarkably similar to cases where low
offers were rejected. Thus, punishing of this kind is not necessarily correlated
with quick responses. There is so far no conclusive evidence on the role of
intuitive and deliberate thinking in punishment behaviour.
One controversial claim in the literature is that intuition leads to giving
and cooperation. Rand et al. (2012) found in an experiment that subjects
who reached their decisions more quickly were more cooperative. To explain
this finding, Rand et al. (2014) proposed a theory that social norms shape our
intuition. Since cooperation is usually advantageous, people form an intuition
to cooperate in daily life and bring it to the experiment. However, several
experiments using time pressure to induce intuitive responses have not repli-
cated the same result in finding that cooperation is intuitive (Tinghög et al. ,
2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). Furthermore, a more detailed analy-
sis by Myrseth & Wollbrant (2015) showed that Rand et al. (2012) and Rand
et al. (2014) misinterpreted their own data and there was no clear relationship
between decision time and cooperation.
Instead of using the response time to measure thinking processes, the
present study uses the well-established fact that some individuals are more in-
tuitive than others and some are more deliberate than others (e.g. Epstein et al.
, 1996). These individual differences can be reliably measured by the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (REI), a self-report 40-item questionnaire, developed
by Pacini & Epstein (1999). The broader theoretical basis of the REI comes
from the dual-process literature in psychology (e.g. Kahneman, 2011; Evans
& Stanovich, 2013), which distinguishes two separate systems of information-
processing (intuitive and analytic) that jointly produce a variety of behaviours.
The intuitive system is assumed to be impulsive, affective, automatic, fast,
unconscious and effortless. The analytic system is assumed to be reflective,
logical, deliberate, slow, conscious and effortful. More specifically, the REI is
underpinned by Cognitive-Experiential Theory (Epstein, 2014), which has the
unique feature of placing the intuitive and analytic systems in a theory of per-
sonality. Other independent studies have also confirmed that the REI produce
both valid and reliable measures of individual differences (e.g. Witteman et al.
, 2009; Hodgkinson et al. , 2009; Björklund & Bäckström, 2008).
The Rational-Experiential Inventory has two independent scales cor-
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responding to the two systems. One scale called Need for Cognition (NC;
adopted from Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) measures the extent to which an in-
dividual engages in and enjoys effortful analytic thinking. This scale contains
20 items, including ‘I prefer complex problems to simple problems’, ‘I don’t
reason well under pressure’, and ‘I have no problem thinking things through
carefully.’ The NC was originally conceptualized to reflect the need to under-
stand and make sense of the world (Cohen et al. , 1955). Since then, hundreds
of studies have investigated how the NC correlates with various behaviours
and personality variables (for a review Cacioppo et al. , 1996). For instance,
people who report a high tendency to think deliberately think more about
available options before making a decision (Levin et al. , 2000), have reduced
sensitivity to framing effects and sunk costs (Carnevale et al. , 2011), and form
attitudes by paying attention to issue-relevant information instead of periph-
eral cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 2012). In many respects, a higher NC does lead
to more rational choices by eliminating behavioural biases, but not all biases
(e.g. priming effect; Petty et al. , 2008).
The other scale, Faith in Intuition (FI), measures the extent to which
an individual relies on intuitive feeling. It contains 20 items, such as, ‘I believe
in trusting in my hunches’, ‘if I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often
make mistakes’, and ‘intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.’
The FI scale was developed after the Need for Cognition scale in order to
measure the intuitive dimension of the dual-process theory (Epstein et al. ,
1996). Several studies have found that high FI scores are associated with
increased reliance on heuristic rules in decision making (Shiloh et al. , 2002;
Danziger et al. , 2006; Glaser & Walther, 2014). For instance, Alós-Ferrer
& Hügelschäfer (2012) found that those who rely more on their intuition are
more likely to fail to update their beliefs based on all available information
because they overweight sample information. Mahoney et al. (2011) found
that people with higher FI scores are more likely to show preference reversal
due to different framing of the Asian Disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981).
This study experimentally examines the role of intuition and delibera-
tion, as measured by Faith in Intuition and Need for Cognition, in social inter-
actions when the cost of punishing varies. An online experiment is conducted
with participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The ex-
perimental design consists of a two-player game, in which the first player can
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decide how much to give to the second player out of a sum of money, and
the second player can then decide how much to punish the first player at a
cost. The game is repeated for two rounds with only the price of punishment
changing between rounds. In the Price Decrease Treatment, the price of pun-
ishment is high in the first round and low in the second round. In the Price
Increase Treatment, the price is low in the first round and high in the second
round. These two treatments allow us to measure how responsive people are
to changes in the price of punishment.
This experiment also allows us to compare the predictions from eco-
nomic theories and dual-process theory of decision-making. The standard
economic theory that assumes material self-interest predicts that no one will
punish if punishing is costly and no one will give if no one would punish those
who do not give. Recently developed theories that incorporate social pref-
erences, such as inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and reciprocity
(Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004), are able to explain the observed willingness
to give and punish. On the other hand, in the dual-process framework, the so-
cial heuristic hypothesis (Rand et al. , 2014) proposes that intuition is shaped
by social norms and deliberation adjusts behaviour towards the personal opti-
mum. Hence, we expect that people who tend to think more deliberately will
give less and punish less. People who rely more on intuitive feelings will give
more and punish more if there exists social norms that encourage generous
giving and punishing selfishness.
We find that many participants are willing to give an equal share and
many are willing to punish those who give nothing. But the price of pun-
ishment significantly reduces that number of punishers as well as the number
of givers. Participants who tend to think more deliberately are less likely to
punish, suggesting that deliberation might restrict the impulse to punish. The
relationship between reliance on intuition and giving is positive but not sta-
tistically significant. We also find that high reliance on intuition is associated
with a greater sensitivity of punishment to a price increase than to a price
decrease, which might be explained by loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Heidhues & Kőszegi, 2008).
This research contributes to the experimental literature that studies in-
dividual heterogeneity in altruistic preference (Andreoni & Miller, 2002) and in
punishment behaviour (Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). First,
Andreoni & Miller (2002) show that people have varying degrees of altruism
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and suggest that accounting for these differences is necessary for understanding
choices. Our study advances this line of research by showing that individual
tendency to give altruistically might be influenced by the reliance on intuition,
rather than an aversion to think deliberately. Second, Anderson & Putterman
(2006) demonstrate considerable, yet unexplained, individual differences in the
propensity to punish and the sensitivity to punishment price. Our study re-
veals more by showing that the tendency to punish can be explained by an
aversion to think deliberately and that the price sensitivity of punishment is
affected by individual reliance on intuitive feelings.
2.2 Experimental Setup
2.2.1 Experimental Design
We design a two-player game which takes place over two rounds. In each
round, the first player can decide how to split a sum of money ($4) between
the participants, and the second player can then choose how much to punish
the first player.
The price of punishment is defined as the amount player 2 must spend
to remove one dollar from player 1. This price can be either high (50¢) or
low (10¢). For instance, if player 2 wants to reduce player 1’s earnings by two
dollars and the price is 10¢, it will cost him 20¢. If the price is 50¢, the cost
for removing two dollars will be $1. In the Price Decrease Treatment, subjects
are assigned to play this game with the high price of punishing in the first
round and then with the low price in the second round. To examine the effect
of price order, we conduct the Price Increase Treatment which starts with low
price first and high price second. In order to prevent player 2 from ending
up with a negative payoff due to the cost of inflicting punishment, the second
players are endowed another two dollars in each round.
To elicit punishment decisions, we use the ‘strategy method’. This
method requires player 2 to give a response for each feasible action of player 1
before player 2 is informed of player 1’s actual choice.1 Since only one action is
selected by player 1, only in this specific case both players’ decisions will affect
payoffs. To simplify the game without losing the possibilities of selfish and
1Brandts & Charness (2011) survey the experimental literature and studied the impact
of using the strategy method. The authors show that using strategy method can affect the
level of punishment but not the qualitative results such as the effect of price on punishment.
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equal divisions, we restrict player 1’s choice set to three feasible actions: to
give zero, one, or two dollars to player 2. This approach enables us to collect
three contingent punishment decisions in response to player 1’s three feasible
actions, even though only one action is actually chosen by player 1.
With regards to the final payoffs, an equal division would be three
dollars for each player if player 1 gives one dollar and player 2 refrains from
punishing. Giving two dollars would then be more than fair, and giving zero
dollars would be most selfish.
2.2.2 Online Survey and Participants
We conduct this experiment using an online survey with MTurk workers as
participants. Since online participants fill out the survey independently with-
out any temporal coordination with other participants, there is no possibility
to give feedback about the partner’s choices during the course of the experi-
ment.2 In practice, we first collect all survey responses from the participants
and then match their responses for calculating final payoffs. All participants
are told that their payoffs depend on their decisions as well as the decisions of
others.
Our survey designates five pages for this section of the experiment.
The first page includes instructions about the game and tells each participant
that he or she is the second player3 and that the price of punishment is 50¢
in the Price Decrease Treatment (or 10¢ in the Price Increase Treatment).
To enhance the participant’s comprehension of the game, we present three
scenarios of possible plays of the game for the participant to compute the
total cost of punishment and potential earnings. We find that 83.7% of the
sample compute the answers correctly. On the second page, the participant is
asked to indicate a punishment decision for each of the three feasible actions
of player 1. On the third page, the participant is informed that he or she
would interact with the same partner again in the same procedure as before,
but the price of punishment is changed to 10¢ (or 50¢). The fourth page states
that the participant is now the first player of the game and is matched with
a different partner. The price of punishment is 50¢, and the participant has
2One limitation of online surveys is that only some types of experiments can be run (for
a review, see Horton et al. , 2011).
3This is the starting point for all participants, and they also play the role of the first
player later. This is possible because participants fill out the survey independently before
their decisions are matched with the decisions of their partners.
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to decide how to split $4 with the partner. On the fifth page, the price of
punishment is now 10¢, and the participant has to split another $4 with the
partner. These five pages together independently elicit all of the contingent
decisions from each participant.
Note that not receiving feedback on their partner’s choices during the
course of the experiment removes some contaminants that would normally be
generated in repeated interactions. Thus, the decisions made in the second
round would mostly reflect the new price of punishment, rather than the in-
teraction in the first round. However, there might still be some effects of taking
the first price of punishing as a reference point for second round decisions.
325 participants were recruited via MTurk in five sessions in September
2014. Participants spent 12 minutes on average to complete the survey and
were paid a fixed rate of $1.50 for completion (the hourly rate for MTurk
workers was $6). All the participants were told at the beginning of the survey
that only one participant in each session would be randomly selected to receive
an additional payment based on the choices in the experiment. The additional
payment included payoffs as player 1 and player 2. A total of five participants
were selected to receive additional payments, which on average were $11.53.
The entire survey was created by using Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics,
Proto, UT).
Although online experiments usually use a lower level of financial in-
centives than physical laboratory experiments, there are reasons to believe
that this does not affect data quality. First, MTurk workers are willing to
accept lower wages because they do not have to pay travel costs and they
have flexibility to choose when to work. Second, Mason & Watts (2010) found
that when wages increased from $0.01 to $0.10 per task, MTurk workers com-
pleted a larger number of tasks, but there was no difference in the quality
of work. This finding is consistent with the modal result of a survey of 74
experiments done by Camerer & Hogarth (1999), who showed that financial
incentives have no effect on mean performance in most experiments, except
in tasks that are responsive to better effort. Lastly, Horton et al. (2011)
used MTurk to replicate the results of three classic experiments: the level of
cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the framing effect demonstrated by
Tversky & Kahneman (1981), and the priming effect on cooperation.
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2.3 Predictions
This section first describes the predictions of economic theories for our exper-
iment. We then consider other hypotheses based on the dual-process theory
of decision making.
The standard economic theory assumes that players have common knowl-
edge that every player is rational in maximizing their own material payoffs.
For the experiment, the prediction of the subgame perfect equilibrium is the
following: Player 2 will not punish, regardless of player 1’s giving decision, be-
cause punishing is costly. Player 1 will not give anything to player 2 because
he knows that player 2 will not punish him even if he gives nothing.
Yet, a substantial number of people in this type of experiments do
not follow the prediction of rationality or material self-interest. To explain
this behaviour, recently developed theories incorporate social preferences such
as inequality aversion and reciprocity. Models by Fehr & Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) assume that people dislike inequality and aim
to reduce the payoff difference between players. Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger
(2004) and Falk & Fischbacher (2006) incorporate a notion of reciprocity that
kind or unkind intentions behind an action can trigger reciprocal behaviour.
All these models predict that for sufficiently strong concern about equality or
reciprocity, player 1 will give a positive amount of money to player 2, and
player 2 will punish player 1 who gives an amount that is considered unequal
or unkind.
The prediction on the impact of changes in the price of punishment on
punishment decisions is less clear. For instance, Fehr & Schmidt’s model of
inequality aversion can generate multiple equilibria. For a sufficiently strong
aversion to inequality, player 2 will punish more when the punishment price is
high. The reason is that the amount of payoff difference between two players
that is reduced by a punishment unit ($1) is smaller at a high price ($1−50¢ =
50¢) than at low price ($1 − 10¢ = 90¢). Hence, more punishment units are
required at a high price to reduce the same amount of payoff difference than
at low price. But there are also plausible equilibria where player 2 will punish
less when the punishment price is high.
Our main interest is to look at the relation between the predictions of
economic theories and dual-process theory of decision making. Rand et al.
(2014) proposed a social heuristic hypothesis that intuition is shaped by social
47
norms and deliberation adjusts behaviour towards utility maximization. This
hypothesis implies that individuals with a higher Need for Cognition are more
likely to follow the rationality predictions, which are to refrain from giving
and punishing. If the everyday norms that shape our intuition are to give
generously and to punish selfishness, we would expect that people with a higher
Faith in Intuition are more likely to have social preferences that motivate giving
and punishing.
2.4 Results
Table 2.1 separately presents a summary of the experimental data statis-
tics and the characteristics of MTurk workers for Price Decrease Treatment
(N = 161) and Price Increase Treatment (N = 164). More than 65% of the
participants are white and an almost equal number of male and female. About
40% of the participants are younger than twenty-nine years old, and 10% are
at least fifty years old. More than half had attained at least a Bachelor’s de-
gree. The last column of Table 2.1 shows that individual characteristics, such
as gender, age, race, education, etc., are statistically identical across treat-
ments at 5% level. This suggests that participants are well randomized across
treatment conditions.
Table 2.1 also checks whether there is a treatment effect on the partic-
ipant decisions making. For instance, when the price of punishing is high, the
distribution of punishment in the Price Decrease Treatment is not significantly
different from the Price Increase Treatment. Similarly, no treatment effect is
found when the price of punishing is low. Thus, the second punishment de-
cision is not biased on average by the exposure to the first round. However,
this does not preclude the possibility that a price increase will affect the price
sensitivity of punishment in a different way than a price decrease.
Faith in Intuition varies in our sample from 1.05 to 5.00 with an average
of 3.32. Need for Cognition varies from 1.65 to 5.00 with an average of 3.70.
The correlation between Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition is close
to zero and insignificant (Spearman rank correlation: −0.075, p = 0.179).
A scatterplot of these two scales also shows no clear relationship between
intuitive and deliberate thinking (see Figure 2.9 in the Appendix). This is
consistent with the previous finding that these two scales are independent
dimensions of the dual-process model (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). We also find
48




Variables Mean S. D. Mean S. D. p-value
High price of punishment (50¢) 1st round 2nd round
Punishment ($): if partner gives $0 $1.22 1.40 $1.23 1.48 0.69
if partner gives $1 $0.75 1.00 $0.79 1.06 0.99
if partner gives $2 $0.36 0.86 $0.38 0.86 0.76
Punishing frequency: if partner gives $0 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.37
if partner gives $1 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.66
if partner gives $2 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.79
Low price of punishment (10¢) 2nd round 1st round
Punishment ($): if partner gives $0 $1.90 1.62 $2.06 1.64 0.36
if partner gives $1 $1.17 1.22 $1.15 1.17 0.97
if partner gives $2 $0.45 1.01 $0.42 0.79 0.34
Punishing frequency: if partner gives $0 0.69 0.46 0.73 0.44 0.46
if partner gives $1 0.62 0.49 0.66 0.48 0.49
if partner gives $2 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.46 0.21
Giving when punishment price is high $1.38 0.72 $1.38 0.75 0.82
Giving when punishment price is low $1.47 0.73 $1.46 0.72 0.84
Faith in Intuition (FI) 3.31 0.71 3.33 0.71 0.50
Need for Cognition (NC) 3.76 0.69 3.64 0.65 0.08
Time used to complete survey (minutes) 12.80 6.72 12.15 6.65 0.40
Female 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51
White 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.82
Bachelor’s degree 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 1.00
Cohabiting 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.08
Unemployed 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 1.00
Household income below $25,000 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.10
Age from 18 to 28 year olds a 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 1.00
Age from 29 to 34 year olds 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.71
Age from 35 to 49 year olds 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.60
Age at least 50 years old 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.31 0.86
Number of subjects 161 164
Notes: This table describes the experimental data and the characteristics of MTurk work-
ers by treatment. The first four columns show the treatment averages and standard devia-
tions, and the last column reports the p-values (Fisher’s exact tests for binary variables and
Mann-Whitney tests for non-binary variables) for the null hypothesis of identical distributions
between treatments.
a A few subjects in this age group might be 29 years old because the cut-off in one session
was 29 instead of 28.
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that people high in Need for Cognition tend to take longer time to complete
the survey (Spearman rank correlation: 0.115, p = 0.039; see Figure 2.10).
This suggests that the self-report measure of deliberate thinking does have
relevance to actual behaviour in our experiment.
In the case of player 1 giving zero dollars, 71.1% of subjects choose
to punish when the cost of punishment is low. When the cost is high, the
proportion of punishers drops significantly to 55.7% (Matched-pairs signed-
rank test, z = 6.934, p < 0.001). If deliberation increases the awareness of the
cost of punishing, we would expect that subjects who are higher in Need for
Cognition are less likely to punish. Figure 2.1 portrays this result. The link
between deliberation and cost-sensitivity is further demonstrated by looking at
a subject’s pair of punishment decisions at high and low costs. About 55.4%
of subjects choose to punish at both prices, and they tend to score less on
Need for Cognition than the 28.6% who do not punish at either price (Mann-
Whitney test, z = 3.776, p < 0.001). There is a third group of subjects, 15.7%,
who switch from punishing at low price to not punishing at high price. These
price-sensitive punishers also tend to be more deliberate than the first group
of consistent punishers (Mann-Whitney test, z = 2.479, p = 0.013).
Figure 2.1: Deliberate People Are Less Likely to Punish
 
Notes: This binned scatter plot shows that relationship between the decision to punish
and Need for Cognition. Subjects are grouped into twenty equal-sized bins based on their
Need for Cognition scores, and each bin indicates its average Need for Cognition and its
proportion of subjects who punish.
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According to the dual-process theory, what comes to mind intuitively is
sometimes in conflict with what derives from deliberate thought. The outcome
behaviour depends on situational factors and individual traits. Subjects in this
experiment are likely to face a similar conflict in making the decision to punish.
Angry feelings or concerns for fairness can create a desire to punish, while the
cost of punishing might dampen this desire. Thus, deliberate people might
find it more difficult to override their urge to punish when they are angry.
To test this hypothesis, we divide subjects into two groups based on their
reported level of anger. When receiving zero dollars, about 55.4% of subjects
report that their anger level is at least five out of seven. Figure 2.2 shows that
deliberate people tend to give in to punishing when they report higher levels
of anger.
Figure 2.2: Deliberate People Give in to Punishing When Angry
 
Notes: This binned scatter plot shows that relationship between the decision to punish and
Need for Cognition when the cost of punishment is high. Subjects are grouped into twenty
equal-sized bins based on their Need for Cognition scores, and each bin indicates its average
Need for Cognition and its proportion of subjects who punish. More Angry refers to subjects
who report a level of anger that is at least five out of seven.
2.4.1 Determinants of Giving
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of subjects based on the two giving decisions
when player 2 faces high and low prices of punishment. Almost half of the
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sample give two dollars in both decisions. Only 19.1% give one dollar for
both decisions and 10.8% give zero dollars. This suggests that most people
did not take into account the two dollars endowed to player 2. We also find
that subjects who give two dollars for both decisions tend to score higher on
Faith in Intuition than those who give only one dollar (Mann-Whitney test,
z = 2.882, p = 0.004). However, the intuitive response is not simply giving
more because subjects who give nothing are also more intuitive than those
who give one dollar at 10% significance level (Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.762,
p = 0.078). Therefore, the intuitive response for different individuals could be
either giving two or zero dollars, but not one dollar. Table 2.2 also shows that
15.1% of subjects give less when player 2 faces a high cost of punishment, but
they are particularly intuitive or deliberate. Less than 10% of subjects give
more when the cost of punishment high. These subjects might be confused
because more than a third of them fail to answer comprehension questions
correctly.
Table 2.2: Distribution of Giving Decisions (%)
High Cost of Punishment (50¢)
Give $2 Give $1 Give $0
Low Cost of Give $2 47.1 11.1 1.9
Punishment Give $1 4.9 19.1 2.2
(10¢) Give $0 0.9 2.2 10.8
Notes: Each subject makes two giving decisions: one when thier
partner faces a low cost of punishment, and the other a high cost of
punishment. Each cell indicates the percentage of subjects who make
a particular pair of giving decisions. For example, 47.1% of subjects
choose to give $2 under both conditions.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between Faith in Intuition and
the frequency of subjects giving an equal share of two dollars. Subjects are
divided based on Faith in Intuition into four groups of approximately equal
size. The three lowest intuitive groups have similar frequencies of giving an
equal share, ranging from 48% at high price of punishing to 57% at low price
of punishing. However, the most intuitive group (N = 86) give an equal share
of two dollars about 17.5 percentage points more frequently than the second
most intuitive group (N = 84) when the second player’s punishment price is
high (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.030) and about 15 percentage points more
frequently when the price is low (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.056).
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[1.05, 2.90] [2.95, 3.35] [3.40, 3.75] [3.80, 5.00]
Faith in Intuition
Frequency of Giving $2 out of $4
Low Price (10¢) High Price (50¢)
Notes: Subjects are divided into four groups based on the Faith in Intuition scores. The
number of subjects from the lowest to the highest group: N = 79, 76, 84, 86. For each group
the first bar is the giving frequency when player 2’s price of punishing is low and the second
bar is when the price of punishing is high. Each error bar is twice the standard error of the
mean, approximating 95% confidence interval.
More formally, in column 1 of Table 2.3 we use ordered logit model to
estimate the first player’s decision to give. The estimates are the marginal
effects in predicting the choice of giving two dollars at the means of regressors.
These marginal effects predict the tendency to give an equal share, not just to
give more, because ordered logit model differentiates between an increase in
giving from $0 to $1 and an increase in giving from $1 to $2. For comparison,
column 2 of Table 2.3 reports OLS estimates.
The independent variables in Table 2.3 include High punishment price,
ln(Faith in Intuition), ln(Need for Cognition), Price Increase Treatment (1 =
Yes), and individual characteristics. In column 1, the first coefficient on the
exogenous dummy variable High punishment price is −0.064 and significant
(p = 0.005), indicating that the first players are 6.4 percentage points less
likely to give an equal share if they anticipate the second player faces the high
price of punishing (50¢). This corresponds to earlier results that people tend
53
Table 2.3: Determinants of the First Player’s Decision to Give
Dependent Variable: Giving {0, 1, 2} Ordered Logit OLS
Independent Variables (1) (2)
High punishment price -0.064*** -0.080**
(0.023) (0.031)
ln(Faith in Intuition) 0.110 0.070
(0.103) (0.144)
ln(Need for Cognition) -0.112 -0.142
(0.124) (0.159)












Household income < $25,000 -0.084 -0.101
(0.054) (0.077)
Age from 29 to 34 0.068 0.085
(0.059) (0.088)
Age from 35 to 49 0.026 0.023
(0.073) (0.105)







Notes: The dependent variable is how much player 1 gives to player 2, which can be
$0, $1 or $2. Estimates in column 1 are the marginal effects in predicting the choice
of giving $2 in ordered logit model. OLS estimates in column 2. The binary variable
High punishment price indicates whether the price of punishing is 50¢ (versus 10¢).
The variable ln(Need for Cognition) is the logarithm of the degree to which subjects
enjoy deliberate thinking. The variable ln(Faith in Intuition) is the logarithm of the
degree to which subjects rely on their intuitive feeling. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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to give less when they anticipate that others will be less prone to punish in
response to a higher price of punishment. The variable ln(Faith in Intuition)
in the second row of Table 2.3 is the natural logarithm of the Faith in Intuition
score. Its point estimate in column 1 is positive but insignificant (p = 0.282).
In the third row, the variable ln(Need for Cognition) is the natural logarithm of
the Need for Cognition score. Its point estimate is negative but insignificant at
10% level, suggesting that there is no clear evidence that greater engagement
in effortful thinking reduces the likelihood of giving an equal share of two
dollars.
2.4.2 Determinants of Punishment
In each round, player 2 made three punishment decisions contingent on the
three possible actions of player 1. The reasons for punishment are likely to
differ in nature and vary in degree across these three cases. In the case when
player 1 gives an equal share of two dollars, punishing is likely to be driven
by spite, rather than fairness. In the case when player 1 gives less (one or
zero dollars), people are more likely to punish due to social preferences, such
as reducing inequality or reciprocating unkind behaviour. Thus, we analyse
case by case the punishment decisions and examine the role of intuition and
deliberation in the motivations behind punishment.
Figure 2.4 illustrates a negative relationship between the frequency of
punishing and the tendency to think deliberately in the case when player 1
gives nothing. Based on the Need for Cognition scores, subjects are divided
into four groups of approximately equal size. In the least deliberate group
(N = 77), the proportion of punishers is 86% when the price of punishing is
low. The proportion of punishers remains as high as 71% when the price of
punishing is high. In comparison, the most deliberate group (N = 85) choose
to punish about 29 percentage points less frequently when the punishment
price is high (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001) and about 23 percentage points
less frequently when the punishment price is low (Fisher’s exact test, p =
0.001). Thus, subjects who tend to think more deliberately are associated
with lower likelihood of punishing.
Figure 2.5a shows that reliance on intuition does not have a clear linear
relationship with the frequency to punish in the Price Decrease Treatment, but
the Faith in Intuition has a surprising relationship with the responsiveness to
55













[1.65, 3.20] [3.25, 3.75] [3.80, 4.10] [4.15, 5.00]
Need for Cognition
Punishment Frequency
Low Price (10¢) High Price (50¢)
Notes: Subjects are divided into four groups based on the Need for Cognition scores. The
number of subjects from the lowest to the highest group: N = 77, 84, 79, 85. For each
group the first bar is the punishment frequency when the price of punishing is low and the
second bar is when the price of punishing is high. Punishment frequencies reported are
contingent on the case when player 1 gives nothing, as social preferences are more likely
to be responsible for punishment. Each error bar is twice the standard error of the mean,
approximating 95% confidence interval.
changes in the price of punishing. In the least intuitive group (N = 40),
the proportion of subjects who switch from not punishing at a high price to
punishing at low price is about 23% (as measured by the difference between the
two bars of punishment frequencies at low and high prices for the group). In
comparison, only about 3% of the most intuitive group (N = 38) are responsive
in switching from not punishing at a high price to punishing at low price.
Moreover, the difference in this proportion of price responsive subjects between
the most and the least intuitive groups is large and significant (Fisher’s exact
test, p = 0.014). Thus, the most intuitive participants are less responsive to a
decrease in the price of punishment than the least intuitive subjects.
Figure 2.5b illustrates a slightly different relationship between the Faith
in Intuition and punishment frequency for the Price Increase Treatment. In
the most intuitive group (N = 48), the proportion of subjects who switch from
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4a. Price Decrease Treatment































4b. Price Increase Treatment
Low Price (10¢) High Price (50¢)
Notes: Subjects are divided into four groups based on the Faith in Intuition scores. For each
group the first bar is the punishment frequency when the price of punishing is low and the
second bar is when the price of punishing is high. Each error bar is twice the standard error
of the mean, approximating 95% confidence interval. 4a. In the Price Decrease Treatment,
the number of subjects from the lowest to the highest intuitive group: N = 40, 37, 46, 38.
4b. In the Price Increase Treatment, the number of subjects from the lowest to the highest
intuitive group: N = 39, 39, 38, 48.
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punishing at a low price to not punishing at a high price is almost 19% (as
measured by the difference between the two bars of punishment frequencies at
low and high prices for the group). If we compare this proportion with that of
the most intuitive group in Figure 2.5a, we can see that the decision to punish
is less responsive to a price decrease than to a price increase (Fisher’s exact
test, p = 0.038). On the other hand, the least intuitive group are similarly
responsive to a price increase and to a price decrease (Fisher’s exact test,
p = 0.797). This suggests that only people high in Faith in Intuition display
differential price sensitivity for punishment, depending on the exposure to the
price of punishment in the first round.
Table 2.4 presents regression analyses on the second player’s decision
to punish contingent on the three cases of player 1’s actions. Column 1 in-
cludes the punishment decisions in the case when player 1 gives $0. Estimates
reported are the marginal effects on punishing at the means of regressors in
a logit model. The independent variables in column 1 of Table 2.4 include
High punishment price, ln(Need for Cognition), ln(Faith in Intuition), Price
Increase Treatment (1=Yes), and individual characteristics. The negative and
significant estimate on High punishment price means that the high price of
punishment (50¢) as opposed to low price (10¢) causes the likelihood of pun-
ishing to decrease by 16.1 percentage points (p < 0.001). This number mea-
sures how likely subjects are to switch the decision to punish due to price
changes, and thus it represents the price sensitivity of punishment. The sig-
nificantly negative estimate on ln(Need for Cognition) (p = 0.021) means that
an increase in Need for Cognition score from 3 to 4 (on a scale ranging from
one to five) decreases the likelihood of punishing by 10.9 percentage points.
This confirms the negative relationship seen in Figure 2.4 between punishment
frequency and the tendency to think deliberately.
We also find significant effects of punishment price and deliberate think-
ing on the likelihood to punish in column 2 of Table 2.4, which includes the
punishment decisions in the case when player 1 gives $1. In column 3 of Table
2.4, the punishment decisions are made in the case when the partner gives $2.
Even though these punishments can be considered spiteful, a high punishment
price still decreases the likelihood of punishing. Therefore, subjects who tend
to think more deliberately are less likely to punish, regardless of the cases
when player 1 gives more or less.
Although the coefficient on ln(Faith in Intuition) in column 1 of Table
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Table 2.4: Determinants of the Second Player’s Decision to Punish
Dependent Variable: Logit Model
Punish ∈ {0, 1} If partner If partner If partner
Independent Variables gives $0 gives $1 gives $2
High punishment price -0.161*** -0.143*** -0.038**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016)
ln(Need for Cognition) -0.390** -0.554*** -0.244**
(0.168) (0.162) (0.097)
ln(Faith in Intuition) -0.070 0.074 0.137
(0.099) (0.098) (0.084)
Price Increase Treatment -0.020 -0.019 0.029
(0.051) (0.053) (0.043)
Female -0.013 -0.034 -0.048
(0.053) (0.056) (0.045)
White -0.065 -0.140** -0.125**
(0.061) (0.060) (0.051)
Bachelor’s degree -0.033 -0.031 0.037
(0.055) (0.058) (0.048)
Cohabiting 0.036 0.032 0.068
(0.057) (0.060) (0.046)
Unemployed 0.063 0.017 -0.060
(0.066) (0.070) (0.060)
Household income < $25,000 0.067 0.069 0.114**
(0.056) (0.058) (0.050)
Age from 29 to 34 -0.010 -0.018 -0.073
(0.067) (0.066) (0.046)
Age from 35 to 49 -0.152** -0.098 -0.116**
(0.076) (0.078) (0.047)
Age at least 50 -0.103 -0.041 -0.143***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.051)
Subjects 325 325 325
Observations 650 650 650
Notes: The dependent variable is the decision to punish or not. Estimates are the
marginal effects on punishing at the means of regressors in logit model. The dummy
variable high punishment price equals one when the price of punishing is 50¢ (versus
low price of 10¢). The variable ln(Need for Cognition) is the natural logarithm of the
degree to which subjects enjoy effortful analytic thinking on a scale from one to five.
The variable ln(Faith in Intuition) is the logarithm of the degree to which subjects rely
on intuitive feeling on a scale from one to five. The dummy variable Price Increase
Treatment takes the Price Decrease treatment as the default. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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ln(Faith in Intuition)
Low Price High Price
Probability of Punishing with 95% Confidence Intervals
Notes: At high and low prices of punishment, the confidence intervals for the probabilities
of punishing overlap as Faith in Intuition score reaches the higher end. All interaction terms
between Faith in Intuition, punishment price and treatment dummy are added to the logit
regression in column 1 of Table 2.4.
2.4 is insignificantly different from zero, we find significant interaction effects
between individual reliance on intuition and the price of punishment. Figure
2.6 shows the predictive probability of punishing at a given price of punishment
over ln(Faith in Intuition). When the punishment price is low, the predictive
probability of punishing ranges from 85% for the least intuitive to 61% for the
most intuitive. The probability at a high price ranges from 51% for the least
intuitive to 57% for the most intuitive. At high and low prices of punishment,
the confidence intervals for the predictive probabilities begin to increasingly
overlap as the Faith in Intuition score reaches the higher end. This suggests
that subjects with greater reliance on intuition are more likely to have the
same likelihood of punishing at high and low prices.
Moreover, Figure 2.7 shows the average marginal effects of high punish-
ment price on the probability of punishing over ln(Faith in Intuition). This
effect measures the price sensitivity of punishment and is negative on average
at all levels of Faith in Intuition. However, the negative price sensitivity of
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ln(Faith in Intuition)
Interaction Effects on Pr(Punish) with 95% Confidence Intervals
Notes: The negative price sensitivity of punishment becomes smaller in magnitude for high
Faith in Intuition scores. All interaction terms between Faith in Intuition, punishment price
and treatment dummy are added to the logit regression in column 1 of Table 2.4.
punishment becomes smaller in magnitude for subjects who tend to rely more
on their intuitive feelings. For example, a subject who scores 3 on Faith in
Intuition is 17.5 percentage points less likely to punish if the punishment price
is high, while a subject who scores 4 on Faith in Intuition is only 9.9 percent-
age points less likely to punish if the punishment price is high. Thus, more
intuitive participants are less sensitive to changes in the price of punishment
than the less intuitive participants.
Finally, we find that subjects with high reliance on intuitive feelings dis-
play heterogeneous price sensitivity of punishment. Figure 2.8 shows three-way
interaction effects between Price Increase Treatment (versus Price Decrease),
high punishment price (versus low price) and ln(Faith in Intuition). The effect
of Price Increase Treatment on the price sensitivity of punishment is negative
on average at any level of Faith in Intuition, indicating that decisions to punish
are more responsive to price changes in Price Increase Treatment than in Price
Decrease Treatment. However, this additional sensitivity to a price increase
is not significant at 5% level until the Faith in Intuition score rises above 3.3.
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This suggests that only subjects with high reliance on intuition respond to a
price increase more than to a price decrease. This asymmetric price sensitivity
might be a result of loss aversion.
Figure 2.8: Effects of Price Increase Treatment on the Price Sensitivity of the
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ln(Faith in Intuition)
Three-way Interaction Effects on Pr(Punish) with 95% CIs
Notes: Only high Faith in Intuition scores have a greater price sensitivity of punishment to
a price increase than to a price decrease. All interaction terms between Faith in Intuition,
punishment price and treatment dummy are added to the logit regression in column 1 of
Table 2.4.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Intuition and Pro-sociality
We find a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between individual
reliance on intuition and giving. Previous studies have found conflicting results
on whether prosociality is intuitive or not (Rand et al. , 2012; Tinghög et al.
, 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014; Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2015). Our
study contributes to this issue by showing a non-linear relationship between
intuition and prosocial giving. As suggested by Figure 2.3, the most intuitive
group still seem to be the most willing to give, but the frequency of giving is
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roughly the same for the other three less intuitive groups. Subjects with little
reliance on their own intuition might still give fairly for other reasons, such as
a tendency to ‘rely on the opinion and received wisdom of others’ (Hodgkinson
& Clarke, 2007). If we can control for the tendency to rely on others’ opinion,
we might find a clearer relationship between individual reliance on intuition
and prosocial giving.
2.5.2 Deliberation and the Impulse to Punish
We find that subjects who tend to think more deliberately are less likely to
punish than subjects who are less deliberate. The motivation for punishment
might be spite or fairness concerns, depending on whether the case is when
the first player gives zero, one or two dollars. Our finding suggests that de-
liberation restricts the impulse to punish in all three cases. A previous study
also shows that the punishment rate drastically falls if decisions are delayed
by around 10 minutes (Grimm & Mengel, 2011).
Carpenter & Matthews (2009) find that people often use different sets
of norms in deciding whether to punish and how much to punish. Table 2.5
uses the level of punishment as the dependent variable, and the sign and sig-
nificance of the estimates are similar to those in Table 2.4 except that the
effect of deliberate thinking on punishment level is negative but not statisti-
cally significant. Further research is needed to investigate whether there is a
difference between the effects of deliberation on the frequency and severity of
punishment.
2.5.3 Intuition and Price Sensitivity of Punishment
We find that individual reliance on intuition is primarily associated with how
sensitive the punishment decision is to changes in the price of punishment.
In particular, more intuitive subjects are less price sensitive in terms of both
the frequency and severity of punishment, suggesting a tendency to choose the
same level of punishment at different prices of punishing.4
A possible explanation comes from the theory that moral judgment is
the outcome of quick, automatic intuitions (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004;
4Whether the dependent variable is the decision to punish or the level of punishment,
the interaction term between the price of punishment and Faith in Intuition is positive and
significant.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of the Second Player’s Level of Punishment
Dependent Variable: Punishment ($) OLS Model
If partner If partner If partner
Independent Variables gives $0 gives $1 gives $2
High punishment price -0.760*** -0.389*** -0.069*
(0.078) (0.054) (0.039)
ln(Need for Cognition) -0.593 -0.813*** -0.453**
(0.407) (0.285) (0.220)
ln(Faith in Intuition) -0.366 0.254 0.203
(0.307) (0.189) (0.128)
Price Increase Treatment 0.054 -0.033 -0.033
(0.152) (0.111) (0.088)
Female -0.034 -0.083 -0.121
(0.160) (0.116) (0.093)
White -0.039 -0.184 -0.307***
(0.182) (0.124) (0.101)
Bachelor’s degree 0.076 0.034 0.045
(0.164) (0.115) (0.087)
Cohabiting -0.002 0.006 0.074
(0.173) (0.118) (0.090)
Unemployed 0.170 -0.114 -0.091
(0.213) (0.144) (0.106)
Household income < $25,000 0.247 0.124 0.089
(0.173) (0.121) (0.100)
Age from 29 to 34 -0.006 -0.085 -0.210*
(0.199) (0.133) (0.111)
Age from 35 to 49 -0.432** -0.208 -0.293***
(0.213) (0.150) (0.105)
Age at least 50 -0.030 0.044 -0.303**
(0.290) (0.203) (0.128)
Constant 3.143*** 2.114*** 1.145***
(0.727) (0.503) (0.406)
Subjects 325 325 325
Observations 650 650 650
R2 0.091 0.079 0.097
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of punishment ranging from $0 to $4. The dummy
variable high punishment price equals one when the price of punishing is 50¢ (versus low price
of 10¢). The variable ln(Need for Cognition) is the natural logarithm of the degree to which
subjects enjoy effortful analytic thinking on a scale from one to five. The variable ln(Faith in
Intuition) is the logarithm of the degree to which subjects rely on intuitive feeling on a scale
from one to five. The dummy variable Price Increase Treatment takes the Price Decrease
treatment as the default. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Graham et al. , 2012). Several studies have further suggested that intuitive
thinking is associated with a preference for fairness and justice.5 One theory
of justice proposes that the offender deserves to be punished in proportion to
the severity of the offense committed (e.g. Carlsmith et al. , 2002). Under this
moral intuition, an analysis of the cost and benefit, such as the price of pun-
ishing, should not affect the decision to punish or the decision of how much to
punish. As Kant (1790) argued, ‘For justice would cease to be justice, if it were
bartered away for any consideration whatever.’ People who hold this moral
intuition will not increase punishment simply because the price of punishment
is lower. Therefore, the moral intuition of justice might be an explanation of
why intuitive people tend to choose the same level of punishment, irrespective
of cost.
In addition, we discover that the price sensitivity of punishing decision
is greater in response to a price increase than to a price decrease for subjects
with high reliance on intuition. In contrast, for subjects with low reliance on
intuition, the decision to punish is similarly responsive to a price decrease and
a price increase. The reason that highly intuitive subjects display differential
sensitivity to price changes might be due to loss aversion relative to the first
price of punishment as a reference point (Heidhues & Kőszegi, 2008). For
instance, if the reference point is the low price of punishment in the first
round, then the high price in the second round can generate a sense of loss,
which amplifies the sensitivity to the price increase. Hence, people with loss
aversion would punish in a way that responds to a price increase more than a
price decrease, just as the highly intuitive subjects in our sample. However,
to examine the impact of intuition on loss aversion, we should design a new
experiment to test this directly.
2.6 Conclusion
Many experiments have shown that individuals differ considerably in their
tendency to give or punish, emphasizing the importance to account for this
heterogeneity (e.g. Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Anderson & Putterman, 2006;
5If moral intuition is innate, it must be found in brain responses and early in life. Children
as young as three years old display signs that they dislike inequality when they received
fewer gifts than other children did (LoBue et al. , 2011). A neuroimaging study showed
that accepting unfair offers activated brain regions involved in self-control (Tabibnia et al.
, 2008).
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Carpenter, 2007). This study experimentally explores how individual differ-
ences in dual ways of processing information can explain this heterogeneity.
Andreoni & Miller (2002) specifically argued that fairness and altruism must
be addressed on an individual level because ‘a model that predicts well in
the aggregate may not help us understand the behaviour of individual actors.’
Our study improves our understanding by showing that deliberate thinking de-
creases the tendency to punish and that reliance on intuition has a non-linear
relationship with giving. Moreover, high reliance on intuition is associated
with being less sensitive to punishment price changes and the asymmetry of
responding to a price increase versus decrease. These key findings demonstrate
that the measures of Faith in Intuition and Need for Cognition are a useful tool
in understanding fairness and altruism that motivate giving and punishment.
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2.7 Appendix A: Experimental Instructions
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT
In order to participate in this research study, it is necessary that you give your
informed consent. By responding you are indicating that you understand the
nature of the research study and your role and that you agree to participate
in the research. Please consider the following points before continuing:
• I understand that I am participating in academic research conducted by
the University of Warwick.
• I understand the research team will use anonymized data in any presen-
tations of research results. Data will not be associated with individuals
except where necessary to pay rewards based on performance, and any
identifying data will then be destroyed.
• I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, and that
after the study data collection has begun, I may refuse to participate
further without any penalty.
• By continuing I am stating that I am at least 18 years of age and that I
have read the above information and consent to participate in this study
being conducted.




This survey will take about 15 minutes. Upon satisfactorily completing the
survey, your work will be approved within 48 hours and you will receive $1.50.
You will be randomly matched with two other workers. Depending on
your decisions and their decisions, you can earn an additional payment up to
$20. It will be shown to you exactly how your additional payment is computed.
Only 1 worker who has satisfactorily completed the survey will be ran-
domly selected to receive his/her additional payments. Any additional pay-
ment will be paid when we finish the analysis.
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Instructions
You will be randomly matched with another worker, called Worker A. He/she
will decide how to split $4 between you and himself/herself. You will then
have an option to reduce his/her earnings.
If you choose to reduce Worker A’s earnings, it will cost you something.
The cost of reducing $1 of Worker A’s earnings is 50 cents to you. For example,
if you choose to reduce $2.50 of Worker A’s earnings, the total cost of reduction
to you is 0.5*2.50=1.25.
The experimenter will give you $2 before you decide how much you will
reduce Worker A’s earnings. You can either use them to cover the cost of
reduction or keep them as part of your payment.
Worker A has three options of how to split $4: giving you $0, $1, or
$2. You will need to indicate your choice of reduction for each of the three
options. Since only one will be selected by Worker A, only in this specific case
both of your choices will affect payments. Your earnings from interacting with
Worker A are computed as the following:
Your earnings = (Amount you receive from Worker A) + $2 - (0.5)*(How
much you choose to reduce Worker A’s earnings).
Please allow us to check if we have explained things clearly.
Below are some possible scenarios of your interaction with Worker A. Please
tell us what your total cost of reduction is and what your earnings are for each
scenario.
What is your total What are your
cost of reduction? earnings?
$0.5 $1.25 $2 $0 $1.75 $3.5
If Worker A gives you $2 and
you reduce $1 of A’s earnings, © © © © © ©
If Worker A gives you $1 and
you reduce $2.5 of A’s earnings, © © © © © ©
If Worker A gives you $0 and
you reduce $4 of A’s earnings, © © © © © ©
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Recall: Your earnings are computed as the following:
Your earnings = (Amount you receive from Worker A) + $2 - (0.5)*(How
much you choose to reduce Worker A’s earnings).
Please indicate your choices in three cases below.
How much would you How angry are you with
like to reduce Worker Worker A? Please rate
A’s earnings? on a scale of 1-7.
In the case where Worker
A gives you $0 out of $4, ______ ______
In the case where Worker
A gives you $1 out of $4, ______ ______
In the case where Worker
A gives you $2 out of $4, ______ ______
You will interact with Worker A again with the same procedure as before. The
only difference is that the cost of reducing $1 of Worker A’s earnings is now
10 cents. Therefore, your earnings are computed as the following:
Your earnings = (Amount you receive from Worker A) + $2 - (0.1)*(How
much you choose to reduce Worker A’s earnings).
Please indicate your choices in the three cases below.
How much would you How angry are you with
like to reduce Worker Worker A? Please rate
A’s earnings? on a scale of 1-7.
In the case where Worker
A gives you $0 out of $4, ______ ______
In the case where Worker
A gives you $1 out of $4, ______ ______
In the case where Worker
A gives you $2 out of $4, ______ ______
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Now you will be randomly matched with a different worker, called
Worker B. You will take the opposite role. You can decide how to split $4
between you and him/her. Worker B will then have an option to reduce your
earnings. Worker B’s cost of reducing $1 of your earnings is 50 cents. Your
earnings from interacting with Worker B are computed as the following:
Your earnings = $4 - (Amount you give to Worker B) - (How much
Worker B reduces your earnings).
How much would you like to give to Worker B?
• $0 out of $4.
• $1 out of $4.
• $2 out of $4.
You will interact with Worker B again with the same procedure as
before. The only difference is that Worker B’s cost of reducing $1 of your
earnings is 10 cents. Your earnings are computed as the following:
Your earnings = $4 - (Amount you give to Worker B) - (How much
Worker B reduces your earnings).
How much would you like to give to Worker B?
• $0 out of $4.
• $1 out of $4.
• $2 out of $4.
Your additional payment is your total earnings from interacting with
Worker A and your total earnings from interacting with Worker B. If you are
selected, you will receive your additional payment based on the Worker A and
Worker B’s actual decisions.
2.8 Appendix B: Questionnaire
We used the Rational-Experiential Inventory questionnaire developed by Pacini
and Epstein (1999). It has 20 items for the Need for Cognition scale and
20 items for the Faith in Intuition scale. Participants were asked to rate
how strongly they agree with each item on a five-point scale ranging from 1
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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). To create a score for Need for Cogni-
tion or Faith in Intuition, the twenty responses for that scale were added up
and divided by twenty.
Need for Cognition (20 items)
1. I have a logical mind.
2. I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
3. I am not a very analytical thinker. (Recode)
4. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
(Recode)
5. I don’t reason well under pressure. (Recode)
6. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little sat-
isfaction. (Recode)
7. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
8. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
9. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. (Recode)
10. I have no problem thinking things through carefully.
11. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
12. I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. (Recode)
13. I enjoy intellectual challenges.
14. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. (Recode)
15. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
16. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
17. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. (Recode)
18. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind
it is good enough for me. (Recode)
19. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical anal-
ysis. (Recode)
20. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.
Faith in Intuition (20 items)
1. I believe in trusting my hunches.
2. I trust my initial feelings about people.
3. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
4. I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. (Recode)
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5. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
6. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself
as intuitive. (Recode)
7. I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important
decisions. (Recode)
8. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
9. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain
how I know.
10. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find
an answer.
11. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. (Re-
code)
12. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
13. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
14. I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. (Re-
code)
15. I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition.
16. Using my gut feelings usually work well for me in figuring out problems
in my life.
17. I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. (Recode)
18. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. (Re-
code)
19. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. (Re-
code)
20. My snap judgements are probably not as good as most people’s. (Re-
code)
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2.9 Appendix C: Additional Analysis





















1 2 3 4 5
Faith in Intuition
Notes: The size of each dot represents the number of subjects. The median score for Faith
in Intuition is 3.4, and the median score for Need for Cognition is 3.8.
Table 2.6: Distribution of Punishing Behaviour in the Case of Re-
ceiving zero dollars (%)
High Cost of Punishment (50¢)
Not Punish Punish
Low Cost of Not Punish 28.6 0.3
Punishment (10¢) Punish 15.7 55.4
Notes: In response to player 1 giving zero dollars, each subject makes two
punishment decisions, and the cost of punishment is high in one round and
low in another. Each cell indicates the percentage of subjects who make a
particular pair of decisions to punish. For example, 28.6% of subjects choose
not to punish under both conditions.
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Figure 2.10: Deliberate People Are Slower Decision Makers
 
Notes: This binned scatter plot shows that relationship between total response time and
Need for Cognition. Subjects are grouped into twenty equal-sized bins based on their Need
for Cognition scores, and each bin indicates its average Need for Cognition and its average
response time, measured in minutes.
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Chapter 3




When does the possibility to divorce benefit or harm a society? According to
Becker (1991), ‘A husband and wife would both consent to a divorce if, and
only if, they both expected to be better off divorced.’ The key assumption
is that spouses can bargain efficiently within marriage.1 However, American
household data revealed that spouses have private information that can create
inefficient bargaining. Friedberg & Stern (2014) used unique questions from
the National Survey of Families and Households to show that more than half
of spouses have misperceptions about their partners’ happiness after a hypo-
thetical divorce. In particular, their data indicated that the divorce rate was
higher for couples where one spouse overestimated how unhappy the partner
would be if they separated than for couples where one spouse had the correct
perception about their partner. Moreover, Zhylyevskyy (2012) used spouses’
reported opinions to infer their true value of the outside option probabilisti-
cally and estimated a structural model to predict the frequency of inefficient
divorces. The evidence showed that 22.6% of divorces are inefficient because
these divorced couples would have been better off if they stayed married.
1This is an extension of the Coase theorem (1960) and is also adopted by McElroy &
Horney (1981), Chiappori (1988), Browning & Chiappori (1998), Basu (2006), and Mazzocco
(2007).
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This chapter develops a model to explore the welfare consequences of
allowing for divorce (versus no possibility of divorce) in the presence of asym-
metric information. Suppose each spouse has a private value of the marriage
and can signal one’s value through the process of bargaining. When divorce is
allowed, spouses can negotiate non-cooperatively within marriage by using the
threat of divorce.2 A simple bargaining procedure is used to capture the ef-
fects of two-sided asymmetric information. The setting begins with a married
couple, in which one player is given the opportunity to initiate bargaining or
not. If the first player chose not to initiate bargaining, the marriage continues
as it is. If bargaining were initiated, the second player can propose either to
give a transfer to the first spouse or demand a payment from him or her. Then
the first player can choose either to accept the proposed gift/request and stay
in marriage or to reject and end in divorce.
This model can be broadly applied to any kind of partnership, such
as business or employment relations, where there is asymmetric information
about the other partner’s value of partnership. Dissolution can be beneficial,
but often it is jointly suboptimal because partners might bargain inefficiently
with the threat of separation. Thus, sometimes a fully committed partnership
can be better than partnerships that have the opportunity to freely bargain
and dissolve. All the results of this chapter can be applied to other types of
partnership, but in the following analysis we use marital relationship as an
example.
The first result is that the expected welfare of getting married with a
possibility to divorce is ex ante worse than with no possibility to divorce, if
spouses hold a sufficiently strong prior belief that their partner has a high
value of the marriage. The reason is that both spouses try to extract too
much surplus from each other, leading some efficient marriages, that are jointly
optimal, to divorce. If spouses do not hold such prior belief, the expected
welfare of getting married with a possibility to divorce is ex ante better because
of its ability to end inefficient marriages, that are jointly sub-optimal.
We model interdependent preferences by assuming that spouses may
care about their evaluation of their partner’s hidden value of the marriage.
This means that one’s high or low value of the marriage will affect the other’s
2Spouses became less cooperative, when the divorce cost fell due to the move from mutual
consent to unilateral divorce laws across US states. Evidence shows that both the investment
in marriage-specific capital (Stevenson, 2007) and the degree of risk-sharing drop (Halla &
Scharler, 2012).
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marital utility. Evidence suggests that married couples have interdependent
preferences and thus ‘justifies incorporating “love” into economic theory’ (Fried-
berg & Stern, 2014). Our aim is to investigate how the degree to which spouses
care about their partner’s value of the marriage will impact the welfare analy-
sis of allowing for divorce. Since one’s action during the bargaining process can
reveal one’s high or low value of the marriage, the action can also increase or
decrease the partner’s overall marital utility, possibly generating an outcome
of restoring an initially inefficient marriage.
This type of interdependent utility influences marital bargaining in sev-
eral interesting ways. As players care more about their partner’s value of the
marriage, a second player who has a high value will give a smaller transfer,
in equilibrium, to a first player who initiated bargaining. The reason is that
this transfer can reveal the second player’s high value of the marriage and
thus raise the partner’s marital utility (and the willingness to accept a smaller
transfer). This can also indirectly reduce the chances of inefficient bargaining
and of ending a jointly optimal marriage. Consequently, the ex ante expected
welfare of getting married with a possibility to divorce increases as players
care more about their partner’s value of the marriage.
Moreover, as players have a sufficiently high concern for their partner’s
value of the marriage, a second player who has a high value will even demand
a payment from a first player who has a low value. It may seem surprising that
in equilibrium the first player would still accept the demand. The reason is
that this demanded payment is not as harsh as what a second player who has
a low value would demand and thus reveals the high value of the marriage,
which raises the first player’s utility and confidence in the marriage. This
suggests that the signal or information conveyed through an action can have
a positive impact, even though the action does not seem friendly.
The main contribution is that incorporating interdependent preferences
can eliminate the possibility of inefficient divorce generated by asymmetric
information. An increase in the degree of caring about the partner’s private
value of marriage generally improves and never reduces the ex ante welfare of
getting married with a possibility to divorce. The increased welfare is gained
by ending inefficient marriages and sometimes restoring an initially inefficient
marriage. When players care sufficiently about their partner’s value of the
marriage, the possibility to divorce yields an ex ante welfare that is at least
as high as with no possibility to divorce. In contrast, only when players care
77
little about their partner’s value and hold a sufficiently high prior belief that
their partner has a high value, allowing for divorce can yield lower ex ante
welfare of getting married than if there is no possibility to divorce.
This research contributes to a large literature that has studied the im-
pact of changes in divorce laws on various outcomes, including divorce rate
(Wolfers, 2006), domestic violence (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006), marriage-
specific capital (Stevenson, 2007), trends in divorce rate (Matouschek & Ra-
sul, 2008), and non-contractible marital investments (Wickelgren, 2009). Our
study focuses on two versions of divorce law, which either allows for divorce
or not. This choice of design makes the model more tractable in analysing the
impact of bargaining with asymmetric information on the expected welfare of
getting married.
The remainder of the chapter is organized into four sections. Section
3.2 lays out the model and key definitions. Section 3.3 analyses the case in
which spouses do not care about their partner’s value of the marriage and the
welfare-implications of allowing for divorce. Section 3.4 analyses the case in
which spouses can care about their partner’s value of the marriage up to the
same degree to which they care about their own value of the marriage. Section
3.5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Model
Consider a married couple who observe each other’s material gains from mar-
riage, such as labour specialisation, economies of scale and risk sharing. How-
ever, each spouse has a hidden valuation of the marriage. Suppose each spouse
i ∈ {1, 2} receives an equal material gain from being married z > 0. There
are two types of spouses, denoted by µi ∈ {H,−L} where H,L > 0. A spouse
who has a high valuation of the marriage, µi = H > 0, is a high type, while a
spouse who has a low valuation of the marriage, µi = −L < 0, is a low type.
Spouses have a common prior belief that the other spouse is a high type with
probability q ∈ [0, 1].
The model incorporates interdependent preferences by assuming that
each spouse cares not only about one’s own value of the marriage but also the
partner’s value of the marriage. This means that one is more satisfied with
the marriage if one knows or believes that the partner has a high valuation of
the marriage. To formalise this, let µˆij = Ei[µj|h] denote player i’s expected
78
evaluation of player j’s value of the marriage according to the history of the
observed actions, which is denoted by h.3 Now the utility function of being
married is
ui = z + µi + θµˆij,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree to which one cares about the partner’s value
of the marriage. When θ = 0, both players do not care about each other’s
private value. When θ = 1, both spouses care about each other’s private value
to the same degree as they care about their own value. For simplicity, let the
divorce payoff be zero for both spouses.4 Whether a marriage is efficient or not
depends on the joint utility of being married and the joint utility of divorce.
Definition 1. A marriage is efficient whenever u1 + u2 ≥ 0 and is inefficient
whenever u1 + u2 < 0.
Note that this definition depends on the sum of the two players’ out-
comes, not the distribution of outcomes. By implication, a divorce is inefficient
if and only if it ends an efficient marriage.
Figure 3.1: Bargaining Procedure
u1(M), u2(M) u1(B, τ, A), u2(B, τ, A)
Player 1 B //
M
OO
Player 2 τ // Player 1
A
OO







When a married couple has a possibility to negotiate with the divorce
threat, they proceed to a three-stage sequential bargaining game (see Figure
3.1). In the first stage, player 1 can choose to initiate bargaining (B) or to
3This modelling choice is related to Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008), who developed a
model in which the agent’s utility of esteem depends on the pro-sociality of the principal.
An agent cares more about social esteem from a good principal than from a bad principal.
Similarly, the spouse in our model cares more about having a partner who has a high value
of the marriage than one who has a low value of the marriage.
4If the divorce payoffs favour one spouse or the other, the bargaining power derived
from the outside options can change the equilibrium behaviour. For example, Rainer (2007)
explains how the legal divorce reform from equitable distribution (ruled by courts according
to the contributions made to the marital assets by the spouses and their future needs) to
equal division may have increased the demand of prenuptial contracts.
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stay married (M ). Denote the set of pure actions of player 1 of type µ1 by
A〈1,µ1〉 = {M,B} and a generic action by a〈1,µ1〉. If player 1 refrains from
initiating bargaining and chooses M, the marriage continues and the utility
payoffs to players 1 and 2 are, respectively,
u〈1,µ1〉(M) = z + µ1 + θµˆ12 and u〈2,µ2〉(M) = z + µ2 + θµˆ21.
If player 1 chooses B, the game proceeds to the second stage in which player
2 of type µ2 can propose a transfer of utility, a〈2,µ2〉 = τ ∈ R = A〈2,µ2〉,
which can be positive or negative. If the transfer is positive, player 2 proposes
to give a payment to player 1. If the transfer is negative, player 2 places a
demand on player 1. In the third stage, player 1 can choose either to accept
the gift/request and continue the marriage (A) or to reject the proposal and
end in a divorce (D). The utility payoffs to players 1 and 2 when the transfer
is accepted are, respectively,
u〈1,µ1〉(B, τ, A) = z + µ1 + θµˆ12 + τ and
u〈2,µ2〉(B, τ, A) = z + µ2 + θµˆ21 − τ.
3.3 The Case Without Interdependent Utility
We first examine the case in which spouses do not care about each other’s
private value of the marriage, that is, θ = 0. Since each player can be of high
or low type, there are four possible combinations: HH, HL, LH, LL, where
the first letter refers to the type of the first player and the second letter refers
to the type of the second player. If z > L, all four combinations are efficient
marriages and there will be no need of divorce. Thus, we make the following
assumption to ensure that some marriages are efficient while others are not.
Assumption 1. z < L < 2z +H.
This assumption implies that player i with a low valuation of the mar-
riage will prefer divorce because u〈i,L〉 = z−L < 0. Thus, a marriage between
two low types (LL) is inefficient. However, a marriage between a low type and
a high type (HL, LH) is jointly optimal because u〈i,H〉+u〈j,L〉 = 2z+H−L > 0.
A marriage of two high types (HH) is for sure better off staying together.
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3.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
When the possibility to negotiate and divorce is present, there exists two
classes of equilibria depending on the value of q, the prior belief that the
partner has a high valuation of the marriage. The following presents the class
of separating equilibria:
Proposition 1. If θ = 0 and 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ, there exists a separating equilibrium,
where qˆ ≡ z+H
H+L
:
At t = 1, a high-type player 1 chooses to stay married (M) and a low-type
player 1 chooses to initiate bargaining (B).
At t = 2, a high-type player 2 proposes to give a transfer τH = −z + L
and a low-type player 2 proposes to demand a transfer τL = −z − H.
Player 2’s posterior belief: Pr(µ1 = H|M) = 1 or Pr(µ1 = H|B) = 0.
At t = 3, a high-type player 1 accepts both τH and τL, and a low-type
player 1 accepts τH but rejects τL. Player 1’s posterior belief: Pr(µ2 =
H|τH) = 1 or Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the separating equilibrium, the first players of different types can fully
reveal their private value of the marriage through their decision at period one.
Player 1 who has a low value of the marriage will always initiate bargaining
using the threat of divorce (B) because they prefer divorce outcome to their
marital payoffs. Player 1 who has a high value of the marriage will always
refrain from initiating bargaining (M) because their marital utility is higher
than the expected utility of initiating bargaining.
If bargaining is initiated at period one, the second players also reveal
their value of the marriage by choosing different strategies in proposing a
transfer at period two. Player 2 who has a high valuation of the marriage
would propose to give player 1 a positive payment τH = −z + L, which is the
minimum that a low-type player 1 would accept and continue the marriage.
Player 2 who has a low valuation of the marriage would not give anything but
demand player 1 to give a payment τ ≤ z − L so that remaining in marriage
would be at least as good as the divorce outcome. Any demanded transfer
will for sure be rejected by a low-type player 1, but a high-type player 1 will
accept a proposal if and only if τ ≥ −z −H. Thus, the optimal strategy for
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a low-type player 2 under any possibilities of meeting a high-type player 1 is
to demand τL = −z − H. At period three, a high-type player 1 is willing to
accept either a gift τH or a demand τL, but a low-type player 1 is only willing
to accept a gift τH .
In this class of separating equilibria, the choice to initiate bargaining
by player 1 always leads to jointly optimal outcomes by ending inefficient
marriages and preserving efficient marriages. For instance, a marriage between
two low-type players is jointly sub-optimal, and in equilibrium this couple
does end up in divorce. A marriage between a low-type player 1 and a high-
type player 2 is jointly optimal, and in equilibrium this couple does remain in
marriage after player 2 gives a positive transfer to compensate player 1.
The condition for the existence of separating equilibrium is that a high-




) ≥ E (u〈1,H〉(B))⇒ z +H ≥ q(z +H + τH)
⇒ q ≤ z +H
H + L
= qˆ. (3.1)
If q, the prior belief that the partner has a high valuation of the marriage,
is above the threshold qˆ, a high-type player 1 would play a mixed strategy
at period one. To initiate bargaining can yield a higher payoff if he meets a
high-type player 2 who is willing to give a positive transfer. However, there is
also a risk in initiating bargaining because the high-type player 1 will have to
accept a demand placed on him if he meets a low-type player 2. The chances
of facing this risk are low if q is sufficiently high, that is, if the prior belief
suggests that player 2 is not likely to be a low type. The following result
characterises the mixed strategy equilibrium:
Proposition 2. If θ = 0 and qˆ < q < 1, there exists a mixed strategy equilib-
rium, where qˆ = z+H
H+L
:
At t = 1, a high-type player 1 chooses to stay married (M) with proba-
bility p and chooses to initiate bargaining (B) with probability 1− p, and
a low-type player 1 always initiates bargaining (B).
At t = 2, a high-type player 2 proposes to give τH = −z + L with prob-
ability r and to demand τL = −z − H with probability 1 − r, and a
low-type player 2 always demands τL = −z − H. Player 2’s posterior
belief: Pr(µ1 = H|M) = 1 or Pr(µ1 = H|B) = q(1−p)1−qp .
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At t = 3, a high-type player 1 accepts both τH and τL, and a low-type
player 1 accepts τH but rejects τL. Player 1’s posterior belief: Pr(µ2 =
H|τH) = 1 or Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = q(1−r)1−qr .
The mixing probabilities are p ≡ q(2z+2H)−(2z+H−L)
q(H+L)
and r ≡ z+H
q(H+L)
.
In response to a high-type player 1’s mixed strategy, a player 2 who has
a high valuation of the marriage also chooses a mixed strategy in equilibrium.
The high-type player 2 mixes between giving a positive transfer τH = −z + L
(which can persuade a low type to accept and remain in the marriage) and
demanding a negative payment τL = −z−H (which can extract the maximum
surplus from a high type). Therefore, in equilibrium, a high type player 1
chooses to stay married with probability p and to initiate bargaining with
probability 1−p at period one in order to make a high-type player 2 indifferent
between giving τH and demanding τL at period two. In return, the high-
type player 2 chooses to give τH with probability r and to demand τL with
probability 1 − r in order to make the high-type player 1 indifferent between
initiating and not initiating bargaining.
These mixed strategies can cause a divorce to be a sub-optimal outcome.
If a low-type player 1 meets a high-type player 2 and this player 2 ‘happens’
(with probability 1− r) to demand a negative transfer τL, the low-type player
1 will reject the proposal and end in divorce. However, this type of marriage is
better off staying together because their joint utility is u1+u2 = 2z+H−L > 0,
indicating an efficient marriage. Hence, the divorce outcome in this case is
inefficient.
Claim 1. If θ = 0, there is no pooling equilibrium.
Here we provide the intuition of this claim. Since a low-type player 1
will always initiate bargaining, the only possible pooling equilibrium is when
both types of player 1 choose to initiate bargaining at period one. Suppose
there exists such a pooling equilibrium. Then, a player 1 cannot signal his
or her type at period one, so player 2’s posterior belief about player 1’s type
is the same as the prior belief q. Now a low-type player 2 always demands
τL because it’s the weakly dominant strategy. If a high-type player 2 also
demands τL, a high-type player 1 will then deviate from initiating bargaining
because bargaining only leads to a lower payoff. Thus, this set of strategies
cannot constitute an equilibrium. If a high-type player 2 chooses to give τH ,
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the chances of meeting a low type must be sufficiently high so that giving τH
would the optimal strategy in preserving marriage with a low type. However,
for player 1, because the risk of meeting a low type who demands a payment
is now higher than the potential gain of meeting a high type who gives a
payment, a high-type player 1 will again deviate from initiating bargaining.
Therefore, there is no pooling equilibrium in which both types of player 1
choose to initiate bargaining at period one.
3.3.2 Welfare Analysis
Now we investigate the conditions in which having the possibility to bargain
with the threat of divorce yields a higher or lower ex ante expected welfare
than having no possibility for divorce. Suppose ex ante the probability of
having a high valuation of the marriage is q. In the bargaining procedure, it
is equally likely to be the first or second player. Let WN denote a player’s
ex ante expected welfare of getting married when there is no possibility for
negotiation or divorce. Then it would simply be the expected marital utility:
WN = q(z +H) + (1− q)(z − L).
When there is the possibility to negotiate with divorce threat, the bar-
gaining procedure results in a separating equilibrium if the prior belief that
any player is a high type is sufficiently low. Let WS denote a player’s ex
ante expected welfare of getting married in the separating equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, the possibility to initiate bargaining leads an inefficient marriage
between two low-type players to divorce and keeps all other efficient marriages
together. Compared to WN , the possibility of divorce yields an expected wel-
fare gain by eliminating the negative expected payoff of being in a marriage
between two low-type players (1− q)2(z − L). Hence,
WS = q(z +H) + q(1− q)(z − L) if 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ. (3.2)
We have also seen that the bargaining procedure results in a mixed
strategy equilibrium if q is sufficiently large. One potential outcome is to
divorce an efficient marriage in which a low-type player 1 meets a high-type
player 2 who ‘happens’ (with probability 1− r) to demand a negative transfer
from player 1 who in turn rejects it. Thus, the ex ante expected welfare if
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qˆ < q ≤ 1 is





[(1− q)q(1− r)(2z +H − L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L meeting H who chooses τL
The first two terms are the same as the expected welfare in the separating
equilibrium. The third term is the expected loss caused by ending an efficient
marriage described above. Next, we investigate whether the loss of divorcing
jointly optimal marriages can ever outweigh the gain of efficient divorces.
Proposition 3. The difference in the ex ante expected welfare of getting mar-
ried between having and not having a possibility to bargain with divorce threat
depends on a threshold q˜ ≡ 1− (L−z)(2z+H−L)
(H+L)2
.
WS −WN > 0 if 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ;
WX −WN > 0 if qˆ < q < q˜;
WX −WN = 0 if q = q˜ or q = 1;
WX −WN < 0 if q˜ < q < 1;
Figure 3.2 illustrates that the expected welfare difference between hav-
ing and not having the opportunity of divorce decreases in q if 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ
(see the dotted line). The reason is that the gain from ending an inefficient
marriage between two low-type players becomes smaller when players are ex
ante more likely to be a high type. However, if q > qˆ, the expected welfare
difference can fall below zero, as the solid line in Figure 3.2 indicates. This is
due to two effects of having a higher q:
WR −WN = −(1− q)2(z − L)︸ ︷︷ ︸






[(1− q)q(1− r)(2z +H − L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss of ending LH who chooses τL
.
The first term is the gain from ending an inefficient marriage through
divorce, and the second term is the loss from divorcing a jointly optimal mar-
riage through inefficient bargaining. As players are more likely to have a high
value of the marriage, the chances of inefficient marriage fall. Moreover, the
expectation that the partner has a high value of the marriage drives people to
bargain inefficiently.
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Figure 3.2: Welfare Analysis

















N qˆ = z+H
L+H
q˜ = 1− (L−z)(2z+H−L)
(H+L)2
3.4 The Case With Interdependent Utility
Now we consider the general case in which spouses can care about their eval-
uation of their partner’s value of the marriage to varying degrees. Player i’s
marital utility is then ui = z+µi + θEi[µj|h], where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is the degree of
i’s concern for j’s value of the marriage and h is the history of j’s actions. For
simplicity, we assume H = L = k, meaning that a high value of the marriage
has the same magnitude as a low value of the marriage, and thus µi = {k,−k}.
Relative to z the material gains from marriage, k represents the magnitude
of the effect of personal value of the marriage on marital utility. The relation
between k and z is important in determining whether a marriage is jointly
optimal or not. Similar to Assumption 1, we make the following assumption
to ensure that at least a marriage between two low-type spouses is inefficient
(if θEi[µj|h] = 0).
Assumption 2. z < k < 2z.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We first discuss the case when 0 ≤ θ < k−z
k
and then the case when k−z
k
≤
θ ≤ 1. The first case is similar to the previous section in generating both
separating and mixed strategy equilibria (Propositions 4 and 5). The second
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case generates separating equilibria as well as a new class of pooling equilibria
(Propositions 6 and 7).
The following presents the separating equilibrium if players care rel-
atively little about their partner’s value of the marriage and if they have a
sufficiently low q, the prior belief that their partner is a high type.
Proposition 4. If 0 ≤ θ < k−z
k
and 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ(θ), there exists a separating
equilibrium, where qˆ(θ) ≡ z+k−θk
2k−2θk :
At t = 1, a high-type player 1 stays married (M) and a low-type player
1 initiates bargaining (B).
At t = 2, a high-type player 2 gives τH(θ) = −z + k − θk and a low-
type player 2 demands τL(θ) = −z − k + θk. Player 2’s posterior belief:
Pr(µ1 = H|M) = 1 or Pr(µ1 = H|B) = 0.
At t = 3, a high-type player 1 accepts both τH(θ) and τL(θ), and a low-
type player 1 accepts τH(θ) but rejects τL(θ). Player 1’s posterior belief:
Pr(µ2 = H|τH) = 1 or Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = 0.
In equilibrium, a high-type player 2 would give a positive payment
τH(θ) = −z + k − θk to compensate a low-type player 1, who is willing to
accept it. A key observation is that τH(θ) is decreasing in θ. This means that
as players care more about their partner’s value of the marriage, a low-type
player 1 is willing to accept a smaller payment. The reason is that the low-
type player 1 becomes more satisfied with the marriage not only because of the
amount of τH(θ) but also because of its ability to raise his belief that player 2
is a high type. Therefore, a high-type player 2 can give less as θ increases.
In contrast, a low-type player 2 would demand a negative transfer
τL(θ) = −z − k + θk from a high-type player 1, who is willing to meet the
demand. Here the absolute value of τL(θ) is decreasing in θ. This means that
as players care more about their partner’s value of the marriage, a high-type
player 1 is only willing to meet a smaller demand. The reason is that the
high-type player 1 becomes less satisfied with the marriage when τL(θ) reveals
that player 2 is a low type. Therefore, a low-type player 2 can demand less as
θ increases.
The following proposition specifies the mixed strategy equilibrium that
exists if q the prior belief that the partner is a high type becomes sufficiently
high and players care relatively little about their partner’s type.
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Proposition 5. If 0 ≤ θ < k−z
k
and qˆ(θ) < q < 1, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium, where qˆ(θ) = z+k−θk
2k−2θk :
At t = 1, a high-type player 1 stays married (M) with probability p(θ)
and initiates bargaining with probability 1 − p(θ), and a low-type player
1 initiates bargaining (B).
At t = 2, a high-type player 2 gives τH(θ) = −z+ k− θk with probability
r(θ) and demand τL(θ) = −z − k − θE1[µ2|τL] with probability 1− r(θ),
and a low-type player 2 demands τL(θ) = −z − k − θE1[µ2|τL]. Player
2’s posterior belief: Pr(µ1 = H|M) = 1 or Pr(µ1 = H|B) = q(1−p)1−qp .
At t = 3, a high-type player 1 accepts both τH(θ) and τL(θ), and a low-
type player 1 accepts τH(θ) but rejects τL(θ). Player 1’s posterior belief:
Pr(µ2 = H|τH) = 1 or Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = q(1−r)1−qr .







, and r(θ) = z+k+θk(2q−1)
2kq
.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, a high-type player 1 sometimes ini-
tiates bargaining because there is gain if he meets a high-type player 2 who
happens to give a positive payment τH(θ) = −z + k − θk. However, this gain
is decreasing in θ, so the high-type player 1 also becomes less likely to initiate
bargaining. As a result, the threshold qˆ(θ) approaches one as θ rises from zero
to k−z
k
. Consequently, the range of q where mixed strategy equilibria exist
diminishes (see Area X in Figure 3.3) and the range for separating equilibria
rises (see Area S in Figure 3.3 for 0 < θ < k−z
k
). If θ = 1 − z
k
, there exists
only separating equilibria for any level of q, the prior belief about the partner’s
type.
Now we turn to the case where players care about their partner’s value
of the marriage to even higher degrees k−z
k
≤ θ ≤ 1. In addition to the
separating equilibria, Figure 3.3 shows that there emerges a class of pooling
equilibria in which both high and low types of player 1 choose to stay married
(M) and refrain from initiating bargaining so that all married couples remain
in their marriages (see Area P). In this equilibrium, even player 1 who has a
low valuation of the marriage chooses M because of two reasons. First, they
care sufficiently about their partner’s value of the marriage. Second, they have
sufficiently strong prior belief that their partner is a high type. As a result,
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such a low-type player 1 derives enough satisfaction from having a strong belief
that their partner has a high value of the marriage to offset their own low value
of the marriage. This occurs whenever
u〈1,L〉(M) ≥ u<1,L>(B)
⇒ z − k + θk(2q − 1) ≥ 0 ⇒ q ≥ −z + k + θk
2θk
.
Otherwise, the two types of player 1 choose different strategies in the sep-
arating equilibrium. The next two propositions describe these two classes of
equilibria if players care sufficiently about their partner’s value of the marriage.
Proposition 6. If k−z
k
≤ θ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ q¯(θ), there exists a separating
equilibrium, where q¯(θ) ≡ −z+k+θk
2θk
:
At t = 1, a high-type player 1 stays married (M) and a low-type player
1 initiates bargaining (B).
At t = 2, a high-type player 2 demands τH(θ) = −z + k − θk and a
low-type player 2 demands τL(θ) = min{−z−k+ θk, z−k− θk}. Player
2’s posterior belief: Pr(µ1 = H|M) = 1 or Pr(µ1 = H|B) = 0.
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At t = 3, a high-type player 1 always accepts τH(θ) and only accepts
τL(θ) if θ ≤ zk , and a low-type player 1 accepts τH(θ) but rejects τL(θ).
Player 1’s posterior belief: Pr(µ2 = H|τH) = 1 or Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = 0.
Proposition 7. If k−z
k
≤ θ ≤ 1 and q¯(θ) ≤ q ≤ 1, there exists a pooling
equilibrium, where q¯(θ) = −z+k+θk
2θk
.
At t = 1, both high and low types of player 1 stay married (M).
At t = 2, a high-type player 2 demands τH(θ) = −z + k − θk and a
low-type player 2 demands τL(θ) = min{−z−k+ θk, z−k− θk}. Player
2’s posterior belief: Pr(µ1 = H|M) = q or Pr(µ1 = H|B) = 0.
At t = 3, a high-type player 1 always accepts τH(θ) and only accepts
τL(θ) if θ ≤ zk , and a low-type player 1 accepts τH(θ) but rejects τL(θ).
Player 1’s posterior belief: Pr(µ2 = H|τH) = 1 or Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = 0.
In the separating equilibrium, a high-type player 2 does not give but
demands a negative transfer τH(θ) = −z+k−θk from player 1 (if θ > k−zk ). It
may seem surprising that a low-type player 1 is still willing to accept τH(θ) and
meet this demand in equilibrium. The reason is that τH(θ) is able to signal that
player 2 is a high type (since a low-type player 2 chooses a different strategy)
and this signal can raise player 1’s marital utility significantly. Moreover, the
impact of signalling one’s high type on the partner’s utility increases in θ.
Therefore, as players care more about their partner’s value of the marriage, a
high-type player 2 is able to place an increasingly higher demand on a low-type
player 1 in equilibrium.
A low-type player 2 chooses τL(θ) as the minimum of two possible de-
mands of negative transfers in equilibrium. One is −z− k+ θk, the maximum
amount that a high-type player 1 is willing to give to him or her, but this
amount decreases in θ in absolute value. The other is z−k−θk, the minimum
amount that he or she requires to be content with a marriage with a low type,
but this amount increases in θ in absolute value. Thus, a higher θ, a greater
concern for the partner’s value, means that a high-type player 1 is less willing
to give to a low type, and a low-type player 2 requires more from a low-type
player 1. As a result, if θ > z
k
both high and low types of player 1 would reject
a demand of τL(θ) from a low-type player 2.
One interesting phenomenon is that an inefficient marriage can be re-




A marriage between a low type and a high type is initially inefficient if
u〈1,L〉 + u〈2,H〉 < 0
⇒ z − k + θk(2q − 1) + z + k + θk(2q − 1) < 0 ⇒ q < −z + θk
2θk
.
If players have a sufficiently low prior belief that their partner is a high type,
their marriage is jointly sub-optimal. However, in equilibrium, a low-type
player 1 would initiate bargaining, and a high-type player 2 would choose
τH(θ), which is accepted by player 1. The joint outcome in this equilibrium
turns out to be an efficient marriage:
u〈1,L〉(B, τH(θ), A) + u〈2,H〉(B, τH(θ), A) = 2z > 0.
The reason is that the revelation of player 2 being a high type significantly
raises player 1’s low prior belief q and thus restores an initially sub-optimal
marriage. This phenomenon occurs if θ is sufficiently high and q is low enough,
as is shown in Area I in Figure 3.3.
3.4.2 Welfare Analysis
Now we examine the ex ante expected welfare of getting married for both
having and not having a possibility to bargain with the threat of divorce. The
assumption is that ex ante any player would have a high value of the marriage
with probability q. When there is the possibility for divorce, it is ex ante
equally likely to be the first or second player in the bargaining procedure.
The analysis focuses on the impact of θ, the degree of concern for the
partner’s value of the marriage, on the ex ante expected welfare of getting
married with or without the possibility of divorce. As a benchmark, when there
is no possibility of divorce, the ex ante expected welfare of getting married is
WN(θ) = q(z + k) + (1− q)(z − k) + θk(2q − 1). (3.3)
The first two terms are the expectation of one’s own value of the marriage plus
z and the last term is the expectation of the partner’s value of the marriage
multiplied by θ. Since players do not know their partner’s true value, the
expected welfare WN(θ) might increase or decrease in θ depending on whether
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q is above or below 1/2.
When players can bargain with divorce threat, there exists three classes
of equilibria, as is shown in the previous section. For the class of separating
equilibria characterized in Proposition 4 (if 0 ≤ θ < k−z
k
and 0 < q < qˆ(θ))and
Proposition 6 (if k−z
k
≤ θ ≤ 1 and 0 < q < q¯(θ)), the ex ante expected welfare
of getting married is
WS(θ) = q(z + k) + q(1− q)(z − k) + θkq2. (3.4)
The first two terms of WS(θ) are the same as the first two terms of WN(θ) in
equation (3.3) minus (1− q)2(z − k), which is the negative expected payoff of
being in a marriage of two low types. The kind of couples always ends up in
divorce in the separating equilibrium. The last term is the expectation of the
partner’s value of the marriage, which might be revealed through the process
of bargaining.
Note that WS(θ) is increasing in θ for any q > 0 in the separating
equilibrium. This means that a greater degree of concern for the partner’s value
of the marriage increases the ex ante expected welfare of getting married with
the possibility to bargain with divorce threat in the separating equilibrium.
For the mixed strategy equilibria characterized in Proposition 5 (if 0 ≤
θ < k−z
k
and qˆ(θ) < q < 1), the ex ante expected welfare is
WX(θ) = q(z + k) + q(1− q)(z − k) −(1− q)q(1− r(θ))z︸ ︷︷ ︸
L meeting H who chooses τL(θ)
+θkq2. (3.5)
The third term ofWX(θ) is the expected loss when a low-type player 1 meets a
high-type player 2 who happens to demand τL(θ), which is rejected by player
1. The other terms are the same as WS(θ) in the separating equilibrium.
Even though there is inefficient divorce in the mixed strategy equilib-
rium, WX(θ) is still increasing in θ. The reason is that as players care more
about their partner’s value of the marriage, the incentive for a high-type player
1 to choose a mixed strategy to bargain inefficiently falls. Thus, the expected
welfare of getting married increases even more when there exists mixed strat-
egy equilibria.
For the pooling equilibria characterized in Proposition 7 (if k−z
k
≤ θ ≤ 1
and q¯(θ) ≤ q ≤ 1), the ex ante expected welfare of getting married is exactly
the same as WN(θ) in equation (3.3). The reason is that both high and low
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types of player 1 choose to stay married without using the divorce threat to
bargain . In this equilibrium, refraining from initiating bargaining can no
longer signal one’s high value of the marriage because both types choose this
same strategy.
Therefore, a higher θ or concern for the partner’s value of the marriage
improves the ex ante expected welfare of getting married in both separating
equilibrium (WS(θ)) and mixed strategy equilibrium (WX(θ)), but not neces-
sarily in pooling equilibrium or when there is no possibility of divorce.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter explores the welfare consequences of having a possibility to bar-
gain with divorce threat. To do this, we develop a bargaining model with
two-sided asymmetric information about the partner’s value of the marriage.
We also examine the impact of incorporating interdependent preferences on
the expected welfare of getting married when there is the possibility of divorce.
Our notion of interdependent preference is that spouses care about their
partner’s hidden value of the marriage. This feature causes signalling one’s
type to have a direct impact on the partner’s utility. If a spouse is revealed
to have a high value, the partner becomes more satisfied with the marriage
and thus more tolerant of the first spouse’s action, even if the action is un-
favourable. This demonstrates the significant impact of signalling one’s hidden
value on each other’s interdependent utility.
The model shows that some jointly optimal marriages can end up in
divorce if spouses do not care whether their partner has a high or low value of
the marriage, yet believing that their partner has a high value and is willing
to give a positive payment. As a result, spouses try to extract too much rent
from each other, leading efficient marriages to divorce.
The main result is that incorporating interdependent preferences can
eliminate the possibility of inefficient divorce generated by asymmetric infor-
mation. A greater concern for the partner’s value of the marriage generally
improves and never reduces the ex ante welfare of getting married when there
is the possibility to divorce. This increased welfare is gained by the oppor-
tunity to signal each other’s private value of the marriage. Sometimes even
an initially inefficient marriage can be turned into a jointly optimal marriage
after bargaining and signalling one’s high value of the marriage.
93
In summary, if spouses care sufficiently much about their partner’s value
of the marriage, having the possibility to divorce yields an ex ante welfare that
is at least as high as having no possibility to divorce. In contrast, if spouses
care little about their partner’s value and hold a sufficiently strong prior belief
that their partner has a high value of the marriage, having the possibility to
divorce can yield lower ex ante welfare than having no possibility to divorce.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The specified strategies constitute a separating equi-
librium because no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to another
strategy. At t = 3, a high-type player 1 accepts a proposed transfer if and
only if the marital utility is higher than the divorce outcome:
u〈1,H〉(B, τ, A) = z +H + τ ≥ 0 ⇒ τ ≥ −z −H. (3.6)
Similarly, a low-type player 1 accepts a transfer if and only if
u〈1,L〉(B, τ, A) = z − L+ τ ≥ 0 ⇒ τ ≥ −z + L. (3.7)
At t = 2, in the separating equilibrium the second players know that
player 1 who initiated bargaining must be a low type and that a low-type
player 1 rejects any proposal less than −z+L. If a low-type player 2 deviates
to choose giving τH = −z + L, he would end up with a negative payoff of
2z−2L, which is worse than the divorce outcome that he gets from demanding
a payment τL = −z−H. If a high-type player 2 deviates to choose demanding
τL, he would be rejected and receive the divorce outcome, which is worse than
giving a transfer τH that is accepted by a low-type player 1 and ending up
with positive marital utility of 2z + H − L. Therefore, neither type of player
2 would deviate from their strategies in the equilibrium.
At t = 1, a low-type player 1 would never choose M because he gets a
negative marital payoff of z−L, which is strictly less than the divorce outcome.
A high-type player 1 would deviate to choose B only if the expected utility
of initiating bargaining is higher than the utility of staying married. Thus,
if condition (3.1) is satisfied, a high-type player 1 will always choose M and
there exists a separating equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2. At t = 3, the same individual rationality conditions
(3.6) and (3.7) apply in the mixed strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
a high-type player 1 must be indifferent between choosing M and B at t = 1:
E[u〈1,H〉(M)|r] = E[u〈1,H〉(B)|r]
⇒ z +H = qr(H + L) ⇒ r = z +H
q(H + L)
.
For r to be less than one, q must be greater than z+H
L+H
. After observing player
1 choosing B, player 2 updates the posterior probability that player 1 has a
high valuation of the marriage:
Pr(µ1 = H|B) = q(1− p)
q(1− p) + (1− q) .
In the equilibrium, a high-type player 2 must also be indifferent between choos-
ing τH = −z + L and τL = −z −H at t = 2:
E[u〈2,H〉(B, τH)|p] = E[u〈2,H〉(B, τL)|p]
⇒ 2z +H − L = Pr(µ1 = H|B) ∗ (2z + 2H)
⇒ p = q(2z + 2H)− (2z +H − L)
q(H + L)
For p less than one, q must be less than one. For p to be greater than one,
q must be greater than 2z+H−L
2z+2H
, which is less than z+H
L+H
. Thus, there exists a
mixed strategy equilibrium only if z+H
L+H
< q < 1.
Proof of Claim 1. The only possible pooling equilibrium is when a〈1,H〉 =
a〈1,L〉 = B. Suppose there exists such a pooling equilibrium. Then player
2’s posterior belief is Pr(µ1 = H|B) = q. A low-type player 2 always chooses
τL = −z − H, but a high-type player 2 may choose τL or τH = −z + L. If
a high-type player 2 chooses τL, a high-type player 1 will always deviate to
chooseM because u〈1,H〉(M) > u〈1,H〉(B) ⇒ z+H > 0. This contradicts with
the existence of the pooling equilibrium. If a high-type player 2 chooses τH ,
the incentive compatibility requires that E(u〈2,H〉(B, τH)) ≥ E(u〈2,H〉(B, τL))
⇒ q ≤ 2z +H − L
2z + 2H
. (3.8)
By Assumption 1, condition (3.8) implies that condition (3.1) holds, suggesting
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that a high-type player 1 will deviate to chooseM . This again contradicts with
the existence of the pooling equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. If 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ, WS −WN = −(1 − q)2(z − L) > 0. If





[(1− q)q(1− r)(2z +H − L)].





< q < 1.
Proof of Propositions 4. This proposition is a generalization of Proposition 1,
so the proof is very similar. At t = 3, a high-type player 1 accepts a proposed
transfer if and only if the marital utility is higher than the divorce outcome:
u〈1,H〉(B, τ, A) ≥ 0 ⇒ τ ≥ −z − k − θE1[µ2|τ ]. (3.9)
Similarly, a low-type player 1 accepts a transfer if and only if
u〈1,L〉(B, τ, A) ≥ 0 ⇒ τ ≥ −z + k − θE1[µ2|τ ]. (3.10)
In the separating equilibrium player 2 knows that Pr(µ1 = H|B) = 0
and player 1 knows that Pr(µ2 = H|τH) = 1 and Pr(µ2 = H|τL) = 0. If a
low-type player 2 deviates to giving τH = −z + k − θk, he will end up with
a lower payoff in marriage. If a high-type player 2 deviates to demanding
τL = −z − k + θk, he will end up with a divorce outcome because a low-type
player 1 will reject τL. This zero outcome is less than a positive outcome of 2z
by giving τH that will be accepted by a low-type player 1. Therefore, neither
type of player 2 would deviate from their strategies in the equilibrium.
At t = 1, a low-type player 1 would deviate to choose M if u〈1,L〉(M) ≥
u〈1,L〉(B) ⇒ z − k + θk(2q − 1) ≥ 0
⇒ q ≥ −z + k + θk
2θk
= q¯(θ). (3.11)
Since the range of θ for this equilibrium is 0 ≤ θ < k−z
k
, q¯(θ) is always greater
than one. Thus, a low-type player 1 will not deviate to chooseM . A high-type
player 1 will deviate to choose B if E(u〈1,H〉(B)) ≥ E(u〈1,H〉(M)) ⇒ q(2k) ≥
z + k + θk(2q − 1)
⇒ q ≥ z + k − θk
2k − 2θk = qˆ(θ) (3.12)
Thus, given that q ≤ qˆ(θ), a high-type player 1 will choose M and there exists
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a separating equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5. At t = 3, the individual rationality conditions (3.9)
and (3.10) both apply in the mixed strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
a high-type player 1 must be indifferent between choosing M and B at t = 1:
E[u〈1,H〉(M)|r(θ)] = E[u〈1,H〉(B)|r(θ)]
⇒ z + k + θk(2q − 1) = qr(2k) ⇒ r(θ) = z + k + θk(2q − 1)
2kq
.
For r(θ) to be less than one, q must be greater than qˆ(θ). After observing
player 1 choosing B, player 2 updates the posterior probability that player 1
has a high valuation of the marriage:
Pr(µ1 = H|B) = q(1− p)
q(1− p) + (1− q) .
In the equilibrium, a high-type player 2 must also be indifferent between choos-
ing τH(θ) = −z + k − θk and τL(θ) = −z − k − θE1[µ2|τL] at t = 2:
E[u〈2,H〉(B, τH)|p(θ)] = E[u〈2,H〉(B, τL)|p(θ)]
⇒ 2z + θ(k + E1[µ1|B]) = Pr(µ1 = H|B)(2z + 2k + θ(k + E1[µ2|τL]))
⇒ p(θ) = (2z + 2k)q − 2z + θ(E1[µ2|τL]− k)q
2kq + θ(E1[µ2|τL]− k)q ,





. A low-type player 2 chooses the same τL(θ)
because any τ > τL(θ) yields a lower payoff and any τ < τL(θ) is rejected by
player 1. Thus, no player has an incentive to deviate from the specified mixed
strategy equilibrium if qˆ(θ) < q < 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. The separating equilibria in the range of k−z
k
≤ θ ≤ 1
are similar to the separating equilibria in the range 0 ≤ θ < k−z
k
(in Proposition
4) except a few differences. First, according to individual rationality condition
(3.9), a high-type player 1 at t = 3 accepts τL(θ) if θ ≤ zk and rejects it if θ > zk .
Second, a low-type player 2 chooses τL(θ) = min{−z − k + θk, z − k − θk},
which is always rejected by a low-type player 1. Again, any deviation from
this strategy either yields a lower payoff or is still rejected. Third, according
to the constraint (3.11), q must be less than or equal to q¯(θ) so that a low-type
player 1 will not deviate to choose M .
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Proof of Proposition 7. The pooling equilibrium in which both types of player
1 choose M exists if the constraint (3.11) is satisfied. The game then ends
at t = 1, and the second and third stages of the bargaining procedure is
not reached. Since any belief off the equilibrium path is consistent with the
other player’s strategy, we specify off-equilibrium beliefs and strategies to be
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